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I. Introduction
The killer of as many as 265,000 people by the year 2015.1 The
cause of illness for 10,000 people per year.2 “[T]he longest-running
mass tort litigation in the United States.”3 The reason over $70 billion
was spent in litigation costs through 2002.4 The source of over 400
pending cases in the state of Delaware alone as of October 2012.5 “[A]
tale of danger known in the 1930s, exposure inflicted upon millions of
Americans in the 1940s and 1950s, injuries that began to take their
toll in the 1960s, and a flood of lawsuits beginning in the 1970s.”6
1. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. AD HOC COMM. ON ASBESTOS LITIG.,
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS
LITIGATION 2−3 (1991).
2. Perry Cooper, As Asbestos Litigation Enters Sixth Decade, New
Approaches to Old Problems, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH DAILY (BNA)
OHD Issue No. 27 (Feb. 8, 2013), available at www.bloomberglaw.com.
3. Id.
4. STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS
LITIGATION xxvi (2005).
5. Telephone Interview with Judge John A. Parkins, Jr., Super. Ct. of
Del., New Castle Cnty. (Oct. 31, 2012).
6. Anchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997) (quoting
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. AD HOC COMM. ON ASBESTOS LITIG., REPORT OF
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These phrases describe the unexpected and devastating effects of
asbestos, a natural mineral with chemical and physical
characteristics that have made it extremely useful for industrial
work.7 Since the early 1900s, asbestos has affected American workers
in almost every industry, including the manufacturing, shipbuilding,
insulation, and automobile industries.8 The federal government has
now classified asbestos as a human carcinogen because exposure to
asbestos can increase the risk of lung cancer, mesothelioma (a cancer
of the lining of the chest cavity), and asbestosis (a nonmalignant lung
disorder).9 These disorders represent just a few of the health hazards
posed by asbestos exposure.10 In fact, asbestos is responsible for
approximately half of the deaths caused by occupational cancer, and
though use of asbestos has decreased, the number of those affected by
asbestos-related illnesses continues to rise.11
Legal scholar Victor E. Schwartz summarizes the current state of
asbestos litigation: “The war is still being waged but the
battlegrounds have shifted to new issues.”12 The “next decade of
asbestos litigation” looks to the consequences of asbestos exposure
extending beyond industrial workers.13 Industrial workers’ family
members have increasingly brought claims of “take-home” asbestos
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION 2–3
(1991)).
7. See Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, NAT’L CANCER INST. (May 1,
2009), http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/asbestos (last visited
Jan. 28, 2014) (describing the nature of asbestos fibers) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
8. See id. (listing the industries in which asbestos exposure has most
likely occurred).
9. See id. (stating that asbestos causes different cancers of the lung).
10. See id. (“In addition to lung cancer and mesothelioma, some studies
have suggested an association between asbestos exposure and gastrointestinal
and colorectal cancers, as well as an elevated risk for cancers of the throat,
kidney, esophagus, and gallbladder.”).
11. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., ELIMINATION OF ASBESTOS-RELATED DISEASES
1 (2006), http://www.who.int/occupational_health/publications/asbestosrelated
diseases.pdf (describing the impact asbestos exposure has had on public health).
Even if industries stop using asbestos, because the signs of asbestos-caused
diseases do not materialize until many years after the exposure, the number of
asbestos-related deaths will remain steady for several more decades. Id.
12. Victor E. Schwartz, A Letter to the Nation’s Trial Judges: Asbestos
Litigation, Major Progress Made over the Past Decade and Hurdles You Can
Vault in the Next, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 1, 32 (2012).
13. Id. at 20.
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exposure (also designated as “secondary exposure,” “bystander
exposure,” or “nonoccupational exposure”) against the workers’
employers. The claimants allege that they contracted asbestos-related
illnesses from exposure to the asbestos fibers brought home on a
family member’s work clothes.
Though these claimants never entered the employer’s facility,
they argue that the employer who used asbestos on his premises
should have known of the dangers posed by the mineral. They
contend that the employer had a duty, as an employer or as a
premises owner, to prevent the asbestos fibers from contaminating
households either by warning the family or by ensuring that workers
changed clothes prior to returning home. Oftentimes, the plaintiffs in
these cases are spouses who had laundered their husbands’ asbestoscovered work clothes after he returned from his employer’s facility
each day. The victims of take-home asbestos exposure also include
children of asbestos workers who had contact with their father while
he wore his contaminated work clothes.14
Take-home asbestos exposure represents a new method for
prolonging asbestos litigation. Lawsuits arising from take-home
asbestos exposure have been finding their way onto the dockets of
state courts, which are already overwhelmed with litigation centered
on asbestos.15 In these cases, courts must determine whether an
employer should face liability for the asbestos-related injuries of its
employee’s family member.16 Courts struggle with answering this
question. While the hazardous nature of asbestos troubles them such
that they want to allow recovery to its victims, the courts are also
wary of the consequences of extending employers’ liability too far,17
especially when asbestos litigation has already rendered almost one
hundred corporations bankrupt.18
14. See, e.g., Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 353
(Tenn. 2008) (explaining the facts of a take-home asbestos exposure case).
15. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 4, at xxiv (stating that approximately
730,000 people filed an asbestos claim through 2002); see also supra note 5 and
accompanying text (citing an interview in which a Delaware judge discussed the
increasing amount of asbestos litigation on his docket).
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra notes 96–101 and accompanying text (reviewing cases in
which the courts worried about the consequences of extending liability to
employers in take-home asbestos cases).
18. See LLOYD DIXON, GEOFFREY MCGOVERN & AMY COOMBE, RAND INST.
FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS BANKRUPTCY TRUSTS: AN OVERVIEW OF TRUST
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Considering these important issues, courts across the country
have not reached a consensus about whether employers owe a duty to
the victims of take-home asbestos exposure under the common law of
negligence.19 Part II of this Note addresses this split among state
courts, describing the various judicial approaches to take-home
asbestos exposure. Part III discusses whether the method of duty
analysis proposed in the Restatement (Third) of Torts adequately
addresses this issue such that courts should apply it when
considering liability in these cases. Part IV provides two suggestions,
aside from the Third Restatement, for responding to secondhand
exposure to asbestos—a judicial response and a legislative response.
II. Background: State Court Split on Whether Employers Owe a Duty
in the Case of Take-Home Asbestos Exposure
Seventeen states have ruled on cases involving liability for
asbestos-related injuries caused by secondhand asbestos exposure or
have otherwise addressed the issue by statute.20 The judiciary has
STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITY WITH DETAILED REPORTS ON THE LARGEST TRUSTS 47
tbl.A.1 (2010) (listing ninety-six companies that have declared bankruptcy with
at least some asbestos liability); id. at 33 tbl.4.2 (showing that in 2008,
bankruptcy trusts paid for 327,000 asbestos claims and spent $2,405,000 in
claim payments); see also STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL
JUSTICE, ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS AND COMPENSATION 71 (2002) (stating that
up to 2002, paying for asbestos claims resulted in over sixty corporations
declaring bankruptcy).
19. Compare, e.g., Olivo v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 895 A.2d 1143, 1149 (N.J. 2006)
(employer or premises owner has a duty), with In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 840
N.E.2d 115, 122 (N.Y. 2005) (employer has no duty).
20. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4905(a) (2006) (“No premises owner shall be
liable for any injury to any individual resulting from silica or asbestos exposure
unless such individual’s alleged exposure occurred while the individual was at
or near the premises owner’s property.”); Martin v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co.,
561 F.3d 439, 446 (6th Cir. 2009) (employer has no duty under Kentucky
substantive law); Campbell v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 405 (Ct.
App. 2012) (property owner has no duty); Price v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 26 A.3d 162, 170 (Del. 2011) (employer has no duty); CSX Transp., Inc. v.
Williams, 608 S.E.2d 208, 210 (Ga. 2005) (employer has no duty); Nelson v.
Aurora Equip. Co., 909 N.E.2d 931, 938 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (employer or
premises owner has no duty); Van Fossen v. MidAm. Energy Co., 777 N.W.2d
689, 699 (Iowa 2009) (employer has no duty); Zimko v. Am. Cyanamid, 905 So.
2d 465, 484 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (employer has a duty); Adams v. Owens-Ill., Inc.,
705 A.2d 58, 66 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) (employer has no duty); In re Certified
Question from Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of Tex., 740 N.W.2d 206, 220
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recognized the jurisdictional divergence among holdings, noting that
“[c]ourts across the country have disagreed as to how . . . broad
principles of tort law should be used to determine whether an
employer owes a duty to persons who develop asbestos-related
illnesses after exposure to asbestos fibers on its employees’
clothing.”21 The variance in state court rulings is attributable to the
different state approaches to determining the existence of a legal
duty,22 which is “a question of law for the [c]ourt to determine.”23

(Mich. 2007) (premises owner has no duty); Olivo v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 895 A.2d
1143, 1149 (N.J. 2006) (employer or premises owner has a duty); In re N.Y.C.
Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115, 122 (N.Y. 2005) (employer has no duty); Boley
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 929 N.E.2d 448, 452 (Ohio 2010) (holding that
Ohio Code § 2307.941 “bars tort liability for asbestos claims stemming from
exposure that does not occur at the premises owner’s property”); Hudson v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., No. 1991-C-2078, 1995 WL 17778064, at *4 (Pa. Ct. C.P.
Dec. 12, 1995) (employer has no duty); Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co.,
266 S.W.3d 347, 375 (Tenn. 2008) (employer has a duty); Alcoa, Inc. v.
Behringer, 235 S.W.3d 456, 462 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (employer has no duty);
Rochon v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., 140 Wash. App. 1008, at *4 (2007) (finding
that employer and premises owner has no duty but still finding it liable under
general negligence principles); see also Christopher W. Jackson, Taking Duty
Home: Why Asbestos Litigation Reform Should Give Courts the Confidence to
Recognize a Duty to Second-Hand Exposure Victims, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1157, 1171 (2010) (estimating that a third of the states have considered whether
employers can be held legally responsible for asbestos-related injuries to
employees’ family members caused by take-home asbestos exposure).
21. Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 361 (Tenn.
2008); see also Musselman v. Amphenol Corp., MDL No. 875, 2011 WL 6415165,
at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 2011) (discussing the “split of authority throughout
the country” on the issue of whether an employer has a duty to warn employees
about take-home exposure to asbestos).
22. See Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 361 (“The courts that ultimately
recognize the existence of a duty . . . have focused on the foreseeability of
harm . . . . On the other hand, the courts finding that no duty exists have
focused on the relationship—or lack of a relationship—between the employer
and the injured party.”); see also In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist.
Ct. App. of Tex., 740 N.W.2d 206, 215 (Mich. 2007) (refusing to adopt the
holding of a Louisiana court because “[u]nlike Louisiana, Michigan relies more
on the relationship between the parties than foreseeability in determining
whether a duty exists” (citing Zimko v. Am. Cyanamid, 905 So. 2d 465, 482 (La.
Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the defendant owed a duty to the defendant’s
employee’s son who was a victim of secondhand asbestos exposure))).
23. Riedel v. ICI Ams. Inc., 968 A.2d 17, 20 (Del. 2009); see also DAN B.
DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 355 (2000) (“Judges rather than juries determine
whether the defendant was under a duty of care at all and if so what standard of
care applied.”).
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This Note divides the courts’ rationales for determining
the duty of premises owners and employers in take-home
asbestos exposure cases into three categories. The first
category represents cases in which the courts focused on the
foreseeability of harm.24 Using foreseeability as a guide has
led to some cases in which the court finds a duty and other
cases in which the court rejects the existence of a duty.25 The
second category covers cases in which the courts found the
relationship between the parties to be the most important
factor in determining the existence of a duty.26 The take-home
asbestos exposure cases that turn on relationship have denied
the existence of a legal relationship between the defendant
and the household member of an employee.27 As such, the
courts have found that the defendants owed no duty to the
bystanders for their asbestos-related injuries.28 The third
category includes cases in which the court based its holding on
whether the defendant’s action constituted misfeasance (duty
exists) or nonfeasance (duty does not exist).29 This method
originates from the Restatement (Second) of Torts.30 This Part
24. See infra Part II.A (discussing the judicial approach that focuses on
foreseeability of harm).
25. Compare Olivo v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 895 A.2d 1143, 1149 (N.J. 2006)
(holding that the defendant “owed a duty to spouses handling the workers’
unprotected work clothing based on the foreseeable risk of exposure from
asbestos borne home on contaminated clothing”), with Martin v. Cincinnati Gas
& Elec. Co., 561 F.3d 439, 446 (6th Cir. 2009) (applying Kentucky law to find
that the defendant had no duty to the plaintiff because, based on the lack of
knowledge of the danger of bystander exposure in the asbestos industry at the
time, the harm to the plaintiff was not foreseeable).
26. See infra Part II.B (discussing the judicial approach that focuses on the
relationship between the parties).
27. See In re Asbestos Litig., C.A. No. N10C-04-203 ASB, 2012 WL
1413887, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 21, 2012) (noting that “where the duty
analysis focuses on the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant,
and not simply the foreseeability of injury, the courts uniformly hold that an
employer/premises owner owes no duty to a member of a household injured by
take-home exposure to asbestos” (citations omitted)).
28. See 1 JAMES T. O’REILLY, TOXIC TORTS PRACTICE GUIDE § 5.4 (2012)
(outlining the cases in which the court did not impose a duty of care because no
relationship existed between the parties).
29. See infra Part II.C (discussing the judicial approach that focuses on
whether the defendant’s conduct constitutes misfeasance of nonfeasance).
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 284 (1965)
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outlines each of these categories, highlighting specific cases to
further illustrate the various methods used for determining the
existence of a legal duty.
A. First Category: Foreseeability of Harm
Many jurisdictions have analyzed the foreseeability of harm
to the plaintiff when determining the defendant’s legal duty, if
any, owed to the plaintiff. State courts in New Jersey,31
Washington,32 Louisiana,33 and California34 have found that the
Negligent conduct may be either: (a) an act which the actor as a
reasonable man should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of
causing an invasion of an interest of another, or (b) a failure to do an
act which is necessary for the protection or assistance of another and
which the actor is under a duty to do.
The duty described in part (b) arises if “there is a special relation between
the actor and the other.” Id. § 302 cmt. a. The Restatement notes that this rule
originates from the “early common law distinction between action and inaction,
or ‘misfeasance’ and ‘non-feasance.’” Id. § 314 cmt. c.
31. See Olivo v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 895 A.2d 1143, 1149 (N.J. 2006) (holding
that the defendant had a duty to the spouses of workers based on the
foreseeable risk of exposure to asbestos).
32. See Hoyt v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 13-35573, 2013 WL 4804408, at
*1 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 2013) (explaining that “[u]nder Washington law,
foreseeability is one of the elements of negligence,” and “[o]n this record, no
reasonable factfinder could conclude that harm from take-home asbestos should
have been foreseeable” (citation omitted)); Rochon v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc.,
140 Wash. App. 1008, at *4 (2007) (holding that the trial court erred in
dismissing the case as a matter of law because an issue of material fact existed
about whether the plaintiff’s injury was a foreseeable consequence of the
defendant’s “risky” conduct). But see Simonetta v. Viad Corp., 197 P.3d 127, 131
n.4 (Wash. 2008) (holding that foreseeability of harm does not imply the
existence of duty).
33. See Chaisson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 947 So. 2d 171, 184 (La. Ct. App.
2006) (upholding the trial court’s determination that the employer owed a duty
to the wife of an employee for her asbestos-related injuries); Zimko v. Am.
Cyanamid, 905 So. 2d 465, 483 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (concluding that the
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff based on the foreseeable risk of danger
resulting from exposure to asbestos fibers carried home on employees’ clothing).
34. See Condon v. Union Oil Co., No. A102069, 2004 WL 1932847, at *5
(Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2004) (upholding the jury’s decision for the plaintiff
because the defendant could foresee that family members exposed to a worker’s
contaminated clothing would be in danger of asbestos exposure). Note that
recently, another court of appeals in California has reached the opposite holding
in a take-home asbestos exposure case. See Campbell v. Ford Motor Co., 141
Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 405 (Ct. App. 2012) (concluding that “a property owner has no
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defendant–employer owed a duty to the household members of
employees because the danger that asbestos presented to them
was foreseeable. Courts in Texas35 and Pennsylvania36 and the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applying Kentucky law37 have
rejected creating a duty on the part of the defendant, stressing
that the defendant could not have foreseen the harm. In this
category of cases, the courts usually begin by distinguishing their
approach to duty analysis from that of other states, emphasizing
the importance of foreseeability.38 Then, the courts analyze the
facts to determine whether the defendant “knew or should have
known of the dangers of secondary exposure.”39
The courts often look to the date on which the exposure
occurred and whether the defendant should have known of the
risks of secondhand exposure based on the information known

duty to protect family members of workers on its premises from secondary
exposure to asbestos used during the course of the property owner’s business”).
Subsequent California cases have affirmed Campbell’s holding. See, e.g.,
Swanson v. Simpson Timber Co., B244266, 2013 WL 5469261, at *1 (Ct. App.
Oct. 2, 2013) (“[L]ike Campbell, we conclude that . . . a premises owner has no
duty to protect an employee from secondary exposure to asbestos off the
premises arising from his association with a family member and fellow employee
who wore asbestos-contaminated work clothes home.”).
35. See Alcoa, Inc. v. Behringer, 235 S.W.3d 456, 462 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007)
(reversing the judgment of the lower court because the defendant could not have
foreseen the harm to the plaintiff).
36. See Hudson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., No. 1991-C-2078, 1995 WL
17778064, at *4 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Dec. 12, 1995) (“Because Bethlehem Steel could not
have foreseen that Mrs. Hudson would be exposed to the asbestos fibers, the
threshold question of duty is not satisfied.”).
37. See Martin v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 561 F.3d 439, 446 (6th Cir.
2009) (rejecting the finding of a duty based on secondary exposure to asbestos
because defendants could not have known of the risk of secondary exposure).
38. See Chaisson, 947 So. 2d at 182 (stating that Louisiana “relies more
heavily upon foreseeability in its duty/risk analysis than Georgia does in
determining negligence”).
39. See Zimko v. Am. Cyanamid, 905 So. 2d 465, 483 (La. Ct. App. 2005)
(citation omitted); see also DOBBS, supra note 23, at 335 (“What the defendant
should have foreseen often depends a great deal on the knowledge and
information he has or should have.”). The knowledge reasonable people can
possess “changes over time and varies over place.” Id. at 289. Dobbs offers the
example of asbestos to illustrate this point. Id. In the 1930s, society would not
expect an architect who designed a building insulated with asbestos to know of
the serious injuries asbestos could cause, but, today, the danger posed by
asbestos fibers is common knowledge. Id.
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throughout the asbestos industry at that time.40 In Condon v.
Union Oil Co. of California,41 for example, the California court
used an expert’s testimony in its determination that UNOCAL
could have foreseen the risk of a worker’s family members
becoming affected by asbestos exposure.42 The expert testified
that “as early as the beginning of the last century, it was known
that a worker’s clothing could be a source of contamination to
others.”43 Thus, because UNOCAL had access to this information
at the time of the plaintiff’s exposure, it was “foreseeable that
family members who were exposed to this clothing would also be
in danger of being exposed.”44 Accordingly, the court upheld the
jury’s finding against UNOCAL.45
Similarly, in Anderson v. A.J. Friedman Supply Co.,46 the
Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey reviewed
witness testimony on the “history of asbestos and the current
medical and scientific reports on its hazards.”47 The plaintiff’s
expert testified that the defendant’s management knew by 1969
about the risks of asbestos exposure to workers and their
families.48 Based on the merit of this testimony, the court
affirmed the trial judge’s denial of summary judgment on the
defendant’s liability.49
40. See Condon v. Union Oil Co., No. A102069, 2004 WL 1932847, at *4
(Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2004) (explaining that information on the dangers of
contaminating a worker’s home with toxic substances was available to the
defendant at the time of the plaintiff’s exposure).
41. No. A102069, 2004 WL 1932847 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2004).
42. See id. at *2 (recalling the testimony of a public health expert).
43. Id.
44. Id. at *5; see also Olivo v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 895 A.2d 1143, 1149 (N.J.
2006) (“As early as 1916, industrial hygiene texts recommended that plant
owners should provide workers with the opportunity to change in and out of
work clothes to avoid bringing contaminants home on their clothes.”). The court
held that the risk of injury to the wife of an asbestos worker “is one that should
have been foreseeable to [the defendant] Exxon Mobile.” Id.
45. See Condon, 2004 WL 1932847, at *5 (concluding that “substantial
evidence supported the jury’s finding that UNOCAL’s own actions contributed to
[the employee’s] clothes containing asbestos and to [the employee’s] leaving the
premises with this toxic dust, which then exposed his then-wife . . .”).
46. 3 A.3d 545 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).
47. Id. at 553.
48. See id. (summarizing the testimony of an expert in public health).
49. See id. at 557 (finding genuine issues of material fact regarding the
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Courts also consider the federal regulations or laws that
existed at the time of the exposure to evaluate what the
defendant should have known. In Catania v. Anco Insulations,
Inc.,50 the District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana
stated that the Walsh−Healey Act51—passed in 1951—
“required that employers provide a change of clothing to
employees to prevent them from carrying asbestos home.”52
Though this Act applied solely to federal contractors, its
existence “evidence[d] a level of knowledge that pervaded the
industry and [showed] a growing understanding and awareness
of a serious problem regarding asbestos.”53 Thus, the risk of
asbestos caused by employees carrying it home on their
clothing was foreseeable at the time of plaintiff’s exposure in
1955.54 Another case considered the Occupational Health and
Safety Administration’s (OSHA) 1972 standards on the
dangers of household exposure to asbestos.55 The Louisiana
court held that because the exposure occurred after OSHA
published these regulations, the defendant should have known
about the risks posed to the plaintiff—the wife of an
employee.56
extent of the plaintiff’s exposure to asbestos). In addition to take-home exposure,
the plaintiff in Anderson also alleged direct occupational exposure, for which the
defendant could not be held liable because of the Worker’s Compensation Act.
Id. But the court stated that the defendant could still be held liable for the
plaintiff’s injuries based on her “separate exposure” to the asbestos brought
home on her husband’s clothes while working for the defendant. Id.
50. No. 05-1418-JJB, 2009 WL 3855468 (M.D. La. Nov. 17, 2009).
51. 41 U.S.C. § 6502 (2012) (formerly codified as 41 U.S.C. § 35 (2006); 41
U.S.C. § 45 (2006)).
52. Catania, 2009 WL 385468, at *2.
53. Id. (citation omitted).
54. See id. (finding foreseeability based on the legislation existing at the
time of the exposure); see also Zimko v. Am. Cyanamid, 905 So. 2d 465, 482 (La.
Ct. App. 2005) (considering whether the Walsh−Healey Act can support the
existence of a legal duty).
55. See Chaisson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 947 So. 2d 171, 182−83 (La. Ct.
App. 2006) (distinguishing the case from Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Altimore because
the exposure in Altimore occurred before the release of OSHA’s 1972 regulations
(citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Altimore, No. 14-04-01133-CV, 2006 WL 3511723,
at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2006), superseded by Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Altimore,
256 S.W.3d 415 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007))).
56. See id. at 183 (“Mr. Chaisson worked for Zachry from 1976 to 1978 after
OSHA revealed the risks of household exposure to asbestos. Therefore, the
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Differing accounts exist, however, about when the
asbestos industry became aware of the risks to household
family members, resulting in courts reaching different
conclusions on foreseeability of harm and, consequently,
different conclusions on the existence of a duty. In Alcoa, Inc.
v. Behringer,57 the plaintiff’s asbestos exposure began in
1953.58 The Texas Court of Appeals questioned “whether the
evidence introduced at trial establishe[d] that it was
generally foreseeable in the 1950s, to an ordinary
employer . . . , that intermittent, non-occupational exposure to
asbestos could put people at risk of contracting a serious
illness.”59 The court determined that researchers published
the first study of non-occupational asbestos exposure in
1965.60 Further, though Congress enacted the Walsh−Healey
Act in the 1950s, the court concluded that the Act did not
demonstrate to employers the dangers of non-occupational
asbestos exposure.61 Based on these findings about the lack of
information available in the industry at the time of the
plaintiff’s exposure, the court held that the defendant could
not have known or reasonably foreseen the danger of exposure
to asbestos dust on workers’ clothes in the 1950s.62 But in
foreseeability reasoning used by the Texas Court of Appeals [in Altimore] is
inapplicable.”).
57. 235 S.W.3d 456 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007).
58. Id. at 458.
59. Id. at 460−61.
60. Id. at 461. The court was referring to the case study performed in
London on hospitalized patients with mesothelioma. Id. The study found that
52.6% of these patients had a “history of occupational or domestic (living in the
same house as an asbestos worker) exposure.” Id. M.L. Newhouse and H.
Thompson authored this study following a rise in the presence of asbestos in the
London area. See Ellen P. Donovan et al., Evaluation of Take Home (ParaOccupational) Exposure to Asbestos and Disease: A Review of the Literature, in
42 CRITICAL REVIEWS IN TOXICOLOGY 703, 708 (Roger McClellan ed., 2012).
61. See Alcoa, 235 S.W.3d at 462 (determining that the Act did not “put
employers on notice of the hazards of non-occupational exposure to asbestos”).
Note that the court’s interpretation of the Walsh−Healey Act counters the
Louisiana district court’s interpretation in Catania v. Anco Insulations, Inc.,
discussed supra notes 50–56 and accompanying text.
62. See id. (concluding that the complete lack of foreseeability of any
danger to one in the plaintiff’s situation cannot be overcome by “other factors
relevant to establishing a duty”); see also Hoyt v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No.
13-35573, 2013 WL 4804408, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 2013) (reviewing expert
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Condon, the court reviewed other studies relied upon by an
expert witness and came to a very different conclusion about
when the asbestos industry became aware that an employee’s
clothing could be a source of asbestos contamination to
others.63
In nearly every case in which a court has used
foreseeability as the primary consideration in duty analysis,
the court has recognized a duty of care in take-home exposure
cases.64 Those cases that focus on foreseeability and yet
deviate from this majority trend do so based on evidence
demonstrating that the asbestos industry lacked knowledge
about take-home asbestos exposure at the time the plaintiff’s
exposure occurred.65
B. Second Category: Relationship Between the Defendant and
the Plaintiff
Other state courts have analyzed the issue of liability for
take-home asbestos exposure using a method that focuses on

testimony and federal regulations to determine that the defendant could not
have known of the risk of take-home exposure to asbestos by 1958); Martin v.
Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 561 F.3d 439, 445 (6th Cir. 2009) (reviewing an
expert report, which found that the risk to family members was unknown until
the 1950s to determine that the asbestos industry did not know of bystander
exposure at the time of plaintiff’s exposure from 1951 to 1963); Hudson v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., No 1991-C-2078, 1995 WL 17778064, at *4 (Pa. Ct. C.P.
Dec. 12, 1995) (finding “nothing in the record which would have put Bethlehem
Steel on notice, prior to 1960, that Mrs. Hudson was in a position to contract
mesothelioma”).
63. See Condon v. Union Oil Co., No. A102069, 2004 WL 1932847, at *2
(Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2004) (recalling the testimony of an expert in public
health who stated that evidence about the risk that a worker’s clothing could
carry toxic asbestos fibers existed before 1948, when the plaintiff’s exposure
occurred).
64. See In re Asbestos Litig., No. 04C-07-099-ASB, 2007 WL 4571196, at
*11 (Super. Ct. Del. Dec. 21, 2007) (“In nearly every instance where the courts
have recognized a duty of care in a take-home exposure case, the decision turned
on the court’s conclusion that the foreseeability of risk was the primary (if not
only) consideration in the duty analysis.”).
65. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (listing cases in which the
court held that the defendant lacked the knowledge about the dangers of
secondhand asbestos exposure necessary to create a duty).
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relationships.66 State
courts
in Maryland,67 Ohio, 68
69
70
71
California, Michigan, Georgia, New York,72 Illinois,73 and
Iowa74 have rejected the duty, looking to the lack of relationship
between the parties as well as public policy concerns. In some
cases, the claimant of take-home asbestos exposure argued that
the employer’s negligence in failing to maintain a safe workplace
for its employees caused the plaintiff’s secondhand exposure to
asbestos.75 The courts have rejected this argument, refusing to
66. See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams, 608 S.E.2d 208, 210 (Ga. 2005)
(declining to “extend on the basis of foreseeability the employer’s duty beyond
the workplace to encompass all who might come into contact with an employee
or an employee’s clothing outside the workplace”).
67. See Adams v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 705 A.2d 58, 66 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998)
(refusing to expand the defendant’s duty to provide a safe workplace to
nonemployees).
68. See Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 929 N.E.2d 448, 453 (Ohio
2010) (holding that a “premises owner is not liable in tort for claims arising from
asbestos exposure originating from asbestos on the owner’s property, unless the
exposure occurred at the owner’s property”).
69. See Campbell v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 405 (Ct. App.
2012) (concluding that property owners owe no duty to protect family members
of workers from secondary asbestos exposure).
70. See In re Certified Question from the Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of Tex.,
740 N.W.2d 206, 213 (Mich. 2007) (declining to “extend the common law” to
protect the plaintiff, a victim of secondhand asbestos exposure, from the
defendant’s conduct).
71. See CSX Transp., Inc., 608 S.E.2d at 210 (“Georgia negligence law does
not impose any duty on an employer to a third-party, non-employee, who comes
into contact with its employee’s asbestos-tainted work clothing at locations away
from the workplace.”).
72. See In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115, 122 (N.Y. 2005)
(refusing to “upset” the “long-settled common-law notions of an employer’s and
landowner’s duties” to include members of an employee’s household).
73. See Simpkins v. CSX Transp., Inc., 965 N.E.2d 1092, 1097 (Ill. 2012)
(considering relationship as the “touchstone” of the court’s duty analysis and
refusing to make a determination on the existence of duty without further facts
(citation omitted)); Estate of Holmes v. Pneumo Abex, L.L.C., 955 N.E.2d 1173,
1178 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (concluding that there was no duty because the
defendant had no legal relationship with the victim of secondhand asbestos);
Nelson v. Aurora Equip. Co., 909 N.E.2d 931, 938 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)
(determining that the defendant owed no duty for lack of a legal relationship).
74. See Van Fossen v. MidAm. Energy Co., 777 N.W.2d 689, 698−99 (Iowa
2009) (refusing to extend the duty of employers and premises owners to
plaintiffs alleging secondhand asbestos exposure for public policy reasons rather
than foreseeability).
75. See, e.g., Adams v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 705 A.2d 58, 66 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
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extend an employer’s duty to maintain a safe workplace to
persons other than employees.76 The Supreme Court of Georgia
came to this conclusion by applying Georgia common law, which
limits an employer’s duty to “furnish a reasonably safe place to
work” for its employees.77 Thus, because the plaintiffs were thirdparty nonemployees, the defendant did not owe them this duty.78
Other courts have performed a balancing test, weighing
various factors to determine whether a duty exists in the specific
case.79 Though each court has not used the same factors in its
analysis, the test has usually considered relationship,
foreseeability, consequences of imposing a burden on the
defendant, and overall public interest.80 The courts have cited the
relationship factor as most important in establishing a duty.81 A
Delaware case applying Pennsylvania law provides a helpful
illustration of this approach as applied in the context of
1998) (considering plaintiff’s motion for a new trial for failure to instruct the
jury on the employer’s duty to maintain a safe workplace for its employees).
76. See id. (“Bethlehem’s duty to its employees was not an issue, because
[the plaintiff] was not an employee.”); cf. DOBBS, supra note 23, at 853 (stating
that without a special relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff,
“defendants are not liable in tort for a pure failure to act for the plaintiff’s
benefit”).
77. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams, 608 S.E.2d 208, 209 (Ga. 2005).
78. See id. (answering the federal district court’s certified question on
whether Georgia negligence law imposes any duty on an employer to a thirdparty nonemployee who comes into contact with its employee’s asbestos-tainted
work clothing away from the workplace).
79. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Litig., No. N10C-04-203 ASB, 2012 WL
1413887, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 21, 2012) (applying Pennsylvania law to
this issue and recognizing that “Pennsylvania courts look to many factors in
considering duty”).
80. See id. (weighing relationship, social utility of the actor’s conduct,
foreseeability, consequences of imposing a duty on the actor, and overall public
interest in the proposed solution); see also Simpkins v. CSX Transp., Inc., 965
N.E.2d 1092, 1097 (Ill. 2012) (weighing relationship, foreseeability, likelihood of
the injury, magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, the
consequences of placing that burden on the defendant, and policy); Campbell v.
Ford Motor Co., 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 400 (Ct. App. 2012) (examining “the
foreseeability of the harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, and the closeness of the connection between the
defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered” (citation omitted)).
81. See In re Asbestos Litig., 2012 WL 1413887, at *4 (“The court finds the
relationship analysis the most persuasive factor.”); see also Simpkins, 965
N.E.2d at 1097 (recognizing relationship as the “touchstone” of duty analysis
(citations omitted)).
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secondhand exposure to asbestos. In In re Asbestos Litigation,82
an employee, whose work involved cutting asbestos cement board,
sued his employer for his wife’s contraction of mesothelioma.83
The plaintiff alleged that his wife contracted the illness by
washing his work clothes, which were covered with asbestos
dust.84 Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not yet
ruled on this issue, the Delaware court needed to predict how
Pennsylvania law would manage the existence of duty in takehome asbestos exposure cases.85
First, the court concluded that the relationship factor weighs
against the existence of a duty because the employer did not have
a “legally significant relationship” to its employee’s family.86
Moving to the next factor, the court held that social utility did not
“tip the scale in either direction” because while society valued the
defendant’s business activities, society also had an interest in
being protected from asbestos exposure.87 Because courts
throughout the country had “found weight for and against
applying a duty under foreseeability analysis,” the court
discounted the foreseeability factor.88 The court determined that
the next factor, the burden on employers, weighed against finding
a duty.89 Requiring the defendant to warn “every potentially
foreseeable victim of off-premises exposure to asbestos [would be]
simply too great” because it would expose the premises owner to
“practically limitless” liability.90 Finally, because four of the five
states surrounding Pennsylvania had refused to create a duty in
the context of take-home asbestos exposure, the court decided
that the policy factor weighed against a duty.91 Balancing the
82. No. N10C-04-203 ASB, 2012 WL 1413887 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 21,
2012).
83. See id. at *1 (describing the plaintiff’s job and his wife’s asbestosrelated illness).
84. See id. (recounting that the plaintiff’s wife laundered his dirty work
clothes two or three times per week).
85. See id. (looking to Pennsylvania law to analyze the cause of action).
86. Id. at *2.
87. Id.
88. Id. at *3.
89. See id. (“The consequences are economically infeasible . . . and as such
this factor weighs against extending a duty.”).
90. Id. (quoting Judge Learned Hand’s risk–benefit analysis).
91. See id. at *4 (“Five of the states adjacent to Pennsylvania have
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factors, the court concluded that the defendant did not owe a duty
to the spouse of an employee.92
Some courts have focused predominantly on policy concerns
in holding that an employer or premises owner owes no duty to
those with whom it has an attenuated relationship, such as the
plaintiffs in secondhand exposure cases.93 In its approach, the
Supreme Court of Michigan concentrated on whether or not
imposing liability in these cases would raise public policy
problems.94 Recognizing that take-home exposure represents the
“latest frontier” in the asbestos litigation crisis,95 the court feared
extending a premises owner’s duty “to anybody who comes into
contact with someone who has been on the landowner’s
property.”96 The court worried that imposing such a duty would
“create a potentially limitless pool of plaintiffs.”97 Thus, the court
declined to extend the law such that the defendant would be
liable for the asbestos-related injuries of the plaintiff, who had
never been on the defendant’s land.98
considered the issue of take-home liability and four of them have rejected it.”).
The court looked to the states in the same region as Pennsylvania because their
interests likely “coincide[d]” more than the interests of distant states. Id.
92. See id. (concluding that the “scale tips in favor of no duty existing”).
93. See, e.g., In re Certified Question from the Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of
Tex., 740 N.W.2d 206, 211 (Mich. 2007) (“Thus, the ultimate inquiry in
determining whether a legal duty should be imposed is whether the social
benefits of imposing a duty outweigh the social costs of imposing a duty.”); cf.
DOBBS, supra note 23, at 582 (defining duty as “‘an expression of the sum total
of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is
entitled to protection’” (quoting DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT K. KEETON, DAVID G.
OWEN & W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 358 (1998))).
94. See In re Certified Question, 740 N.W.2d at 218 (questioning the public
policy ramifications of finding that the defendant owed a duty to the victim of
secondhand asbestos exposure).
95. Id. at 219 (quoting Mark A. Behrens & Frank Cruz-Alvarez, A Potential
New Frontier in Asbestos Litigation: Premises Owner Liability for “Take Home”
Exposure Claims, 21 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP. ASBESTOS 1, 4 (2006)).
96. Id. at 220.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 213 (declining to “promulgate a policy” to “extend the common
law” to hold the defendant liable in this case (citation omitted)); see also In re
N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115, 122 (N.Y. 2005) (“[T]he ‘specter of
limitless liability’ is banished only when ‘the class of potential plaintiffs to
whom the duty is owed is circumscribed by the relationship.’” (citation omitted));
In re Eighth Jud. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 815 N.Y.S.2d 815, 820−21 (Sup. Ct. 2006)
(“A line must be drawn between the competing policy considerations of
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Nearly every case that has turned on relationship or public
policy considerations has concluded that the defendant did not
owe a duty to the plaintiff.99 The courts either determined that
the relationship between the parties was too attenuated100 or that
the “specter of limitless liability” was too disconcerting to hold the
defendant liable.101 The courts in the following category, though
still considering the relationship between parties,102 have applied
a different analysis to take-home asbestos exposure cases.
C. Third Category: Misfeasance and Nonfeasance Under the
Second Restatement
Cases originating in Delaware103 and Tennessee104 have
applied the Restatement (Second) of Torts in determining the
defendant’s liability in take-home asbestos exposure cases. The
Second Restatement distinguishes between “misfeasance” and
Generally,
anyone
who
commits
“nonfeasance.”105
providing a remedy to everyone who is injured and of extending exposure to tort
liability almost without limit . . . . The court must be cautious of creating an
indeterminate class of potential plaintiffs . . . .” (citation omitted)).
99. See In re Asbestos Litig., C.A. No. N10C-04-203 ASB, 2012 WL
1413887, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 21, 2012) (noting that courts focusing on
relationship in duty analysis “uniformly hold that an employer/premises owner
owes no duty to a member of a household injured by take-home exposure to
asbestos” (citations omitted)).
100. See In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of Tex., 740
N.W.2d 206, 216 (Mich. 2007) (holding that because the plaintiff had “never
been on or near defendant’s property and had no further relationship with
defendant,” no duty should be imposed).
101. In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115, 122 (N.Y. 2005).
102. See, e.g., Price v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 26 A.3d 162, 169−70
(Del. 2011) (determining that the defendant’s action was “nonfeasance” rather
than “misfeasance,” requiring the court to turn to the relationship between the
parties).
103. See id. at 166−67 (“To determine whether one party owed another a
duty of care, we have often looked to the Restatement (Second) of Torts for
guidance.”); see also Riedel v. ICI Ams. Inc., 968 A.2d 17, 21 (Del. 2009) (using
the Restatement (Second) of Torts to analyze the concept of duty and apply it to
the facts of the case).
104. See Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 360 (Tenn.
2008) (“[T]he approach of Tennessee’s courts is largely consistent with the
Restatement [(Second)] view . . . .”).
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302 cmt. a (1965) (defining

A CONTINUING WAR WITH ASBESTOS

725

“misfeasance”—an affirmative act—has a duty to others “to
exercise the care of a reasonable man to protect them against an
unreasonable risk of harm to them arising out of the act.”106
Anyone who “merely omits to act” has “more restricted duties.”107
One who is negligent by nonfeasance—omission of an act—has a
duty to protect another from risk only when there is a “special
relation” between the actor and the other.108
In Price v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,109 Mrs. Price, the
wife of the defendant’s employee, sued the defendant for illnesses
allegedly caused by exposure to the asbestos her husband brought
home from work on his clothing.110 Mrs. Price argued that
DuPont negligently failed to warn her of the risk associated with
take-home asbestos exposure.111 The Supreme Court of Delaware
defined DuPont’s action as “pure nonfeasance.”112 Thus, pursuant
to the Second Restatement, the court stated that Mrs. Price had
to prove the existence of a special relationship between her and
DuPont for DuPont to owe her a duty of care.113 Mrs. Price failed
to demonstrate such a relationship, so the court held in favor of
DuPont.114
negligence caused by an actor’s conduct as “misfeasance” and negligence caused
by an actor’s failure to act as “non-feasance”).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.; see also DOBBS, supra note 23, at 855–56 (emphasizing the
distinction between nonfeasance and “conduct that includes a negligent
omission”). Misfeasance creates a claim of negligence, while nonfeasance does
not. Id. Dobbs explains that negligence includes “the omission to do something a
reasonable person would do,” such as failing to apply a car’s brakes when
approaching a pedestrian. Id. at 855 (citation omitted). This omission would
result in a charge of negligence and could not be labeled as nonfeasance. Id. No
settled rule exists to aid courts in making this distinction between nonfeasance
and conduct with a negligent omission. Id. at 856.
109. 26 A.3d 162 (Del. 2011).
110. Id. at 169.
111. See id. (noting that Mrs. Price’s allegations “generate a reasonable
inference” of DuPont’s negligence).
112. Id.
113. See id. (asserting a need of a legal relationship between the defendant
and the plaintiff to impose liability on the defendant for nonfeasance).
114. See id. at 170 (“Because Mrs. Price and DuPont did not share a ‘special
relationship,’ DuPont owed Price no legal duty.”); see also Riedel v. ICI Ams.
Inc., 968 A.2d 17, 25−27 (Del. 2009) (determining that the defendant acted with
nonfeasance in relation to Mrs. Riedel and that there was no legally significant
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In Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co.,115 a particularly
egregious case, the Supreme Court of Tennessee came to the
opposite conclusion. The plaintiff was the daughter of an
employee who worked at a factory containing high levels of
asbestos fibers.116 The plaintiff, born prematurely, spent the first
three months of her life hospitalized.117 Mr. Satterfield, her
father, would visit the hospital every day after work without
changing out of his asbestos-contaminated work clothes.118
Therefore, Mr. Satterfield exposed his daughter to asbestos “from
the day of her birth.”119 The plaintiff contracted mesothelioma
and sued her father’s employer for “negligently permitt[ing] her
father to wear his asbestos-contaminated work clothes home from
work, thereby regularly and repeatedly exposing her to asbestos
fibers over an extended period of time.”120 The daughter died at
the age of twenty-five, and her father continued the suit.121
The Supreme Court of Tennessee heavily relied on the
distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance in its
analysis,122 an approach that is “largely consistent” with the
Second Restatement view.123 The court characterized the
defendant’s conduct as misfeasance.124 The court stated that the
relationship between the defendant and Mrs. Riedel such that the defendant
owed a duty to her).
115. 266 S.W.3d 347 (Tenn. 2008).
116. See id. at 353 (discussing the factual background of the case).
117. Id.
118. See id. (“Mr. Satterfield visited his infant daughter every day she was
hospitalized . . . immediately after work wearing his asbestos-contaminated
work clothes . . . .”).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 351−52.
121. Id. at 354.
122. See id. at 355–56
[T]here is no distinction more deeply rooted in the common law and
more fundamental than that between misfeasance and non-feasance,
between active misconduct working positive injury to others and
passive inaction, a failure to take positive steps to benefit others, or
to protect them from harm not created by any wrongful act of the
defendant.
(quoting Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort
Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 219 (1908)).
123. Id. at 360.
124. See id. at 364 (“[T]he outcome of this case . . . turns on the employer’s
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employer committed the “injurious affirmative act of operating its
facility in such an unsafe manner that dangerous asbestos fibers
were transmitted outside the facility to others who came in
regular and extended contact with the asbestos-contaminated
work clothes of its employees.”125 After qualifying the defendant’s
conduct as misfeasance, the court next considered the public
policy concerns relevant to the case.126 The court recognized the
vast amount of litigation in the United States involving asbestos
products liability127 and that its decision to impose a duty in this
case could possibly lead to a great expansion of duty.128 These
public policy concerns, however, did not dissuade the court.129 It
held that the “magnitude of the potential harm from exposure to
asbestos and the means available to prevent or reduce this harm”
weighed in favor of allowing those who have been “repeatedly and
regularly in close contact with an employee’s asbestoscontaminated work clothes” to pursue negligence claims against
an employer.130
As demonstrated by these cases, the outcome can vary under
the Second Restatement approach. The courts in Delaware found
that an employer’s failure to warn its employees of take-home
exposure to asbestos constitutes nonfeasance,131 and the employer
was not liable unless a “special relationship” existed between the
parties.132 The Tennessee court, however, called such action

own misfeasance . . . .”).
125. Id.
126. See id. at 364–65 (stating that determining the existence and scope of
the defendant’s duty must also include an analysis of the “relevant public policy
considerations”).
127. See id. at 370 (acknowledging the “asbestos products liability litigation
crisis”).
128. See id. at 374 (recognizing the defendant’s policy-based argument that
the duty should be limited to avoid claims from “babysitters, housekeepers,
home repair contractors, and next-door neighbors”).
129. See id. at 375 (considering fairness and public policy and concluding
that imposing a duty of reasonable care on employers is “neither limitless nor
impractical”).
130. Id. at 374.
131. See Price v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 26 A.3d 162, 168 (Del.
2011) (holding that the facts underlying the plaintiff’s claim constitute
nonfeasance rather than misfeasance).
132. See id. at 169 (“Having alleged only nonfeasance, to recover against
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misfeasance and required no showing of a relationship between
the parties to hold the employer liable.133
III. The Third Restatement’s Proposed Analysis for Duty
Determination
Part II of this Note illustrates that courts diverge on the
issue of whether or not premises owners or employers should be
liable in cases of take-home asbestos exposure.134 In fact, judges
within a single court have vigorously disagreed.135 A court that
has not yet addressed this problem does not have a clear path to
follow—it can implement one of the many modes of analysis
already established or develop its own approach to take-home
asbestos lawsuits based on the common law of its state.136 The
lack of consistency among the courts has resulted in confusion
and unpredictability.137
DuPont, Price must allege that a ‘special relationship’ existed between her and
DuPont in order for DuPont to owe her a duty of care.”).
133. See Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 364 (Tenn.
2008) (finding that the case involves “a risk created through misfeasance” and
that “liability for misfeasance is not cabined within the confines of boxes created
by particular relationships”).
134. See supra Part II (describing courts’ differing approaches to take-home
asbestos cases).
135. Compare In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of
Tex., 740 N.W.2d 206, 219 (Mich. 2007) (“[T]he law should not be driven by
emotion or mere foreseeability . . . . [The court must consider] the very real
possibility that imposition of an expansive new duty on premises owners for
offsite exposures would exacerbate the current ‘asbestos-litigation crisis.’”), with
id. at 229 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting)
But the majority is strangely silent with respect to the toll that
asbestos exposure has taken on human life. By focusing solely on the
losses suffered by businesses, the majority fails to account for the
social benefits that would ensue from ensuring that people who are
exposed to detrimental substances and who, consequently, suffer
ruined health, life-altering and life-ending diseases, and the loss of
family members, are compensated.
136. See, e.g., Matt Kendall, Settling the Dust: Trends in Bystander Asbestos
Exposure Litigation, 1 CHARLESTON L. REV. 207, 215−16 (2007) (predicting that
the South Carolina Supreme Court would likely hold employers liable for
bystander exposure because South Carolina “views foreseeability as an
important element to the establishment of a duty”).
137. See Yelena Kotlarsky, The “Peripheral Plaintiff”: Duty Determinations
in Take-Home Asbestos Cases, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 451, 488 (2012) (“In courts’
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Some legal commentators suggest that courts should address
this issue by applying Section 7 of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts.138 With the Third Restatement, the American Law
Institute endeavored to “clarify the meaning of such basic
concepts of tort law as intention, recklessness, and negligence.”139
Section 7, which sets forth the Third Restatement’s proposal for
duty analysis, states the following:
(a) An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care
when the actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical harm. (b) In
exceptional cases, when an articulated countervailing principle
or policy warrants denying or limiting liability in a particular
class of cases, a court may decide that the defendant has no
duty or that the ordinary duty of reasonable care requires
modification.140

Section 7(a) establishes a presumption of duty when the
defendant’s conduct caused the plaintiff’s physical harm.141
Professor W. Jonathan Cardi describes Section 7(a) as
“revolutionary” because it “restates this general principle [on
duty] as black letter law.”142 He says that the provision urges
efforts either to impose a duty or deny a duty in take-home asbestos cases, they
have engaged in unclear analysis and set bad precedents for future cases.”).
138. See id. at 485−88 (arguing that the Third Restatement provides the
best approach to determining take-home asbestos cases); see also Satterfield v.
Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 378 (Tenn. 2008) (Holder, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (“Adopting the Restatement (Third) of Torts would
increase judicial transparency and clarity by requiring that judges frankly and
openly discuss the policy considerations that underlie any no-duty
determination.”); Jackson, supra note 20, at 1181 (arguing that Section 7 of the
Third Restatement provides a uniform model for courts considering duty in
take-home asbestos cases).
139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM at
xi (Discussion Draft Apr. 5, 1999). The Restatements are meant to codify the
“judge-made doctrines that develop gradually overtime.” American Law
Institute, HEINONLINE (Jan. 2013), http://heinonline.org/HeinDocs/ali2.pdf.
Though not binding authority, the courts consider the Restatements “highly
persuasive because they are formulated over several years with extensive input
from law professors, practicing attorneys, and judges.” Id.
140. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 7 (2010).
141. See Kotlarsky, supra note 137, at 460 (describing Section 7(a) as a
“default duty of reasonable care when the defendant’s conduct was a cause-infact of the plaintiff’s injury”).
142. W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 770
(2005).
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courts to treat it “not merely as a default inclination, but as a
substantive rule from which courts should depart only in
exceptional circumstances.”143 Section 7(b) provides for such
circumstances,144 allowing courts to refuse to find a duty for
public policy reasons.145
The comments following Section 7 provide examples of
factors relevant to a no-duty determination pursuant to Section
7(b).146 Foreseeability, however, “has no role” in determining
whether a duty exists under Section 7.147 When a court
determines that the defendant did not owe a duty in a particular
case, it should not support that determination by referencing
foreseeability.148 Rather, because foreseeability is a fact-specific
determination, the jury should decide whether the defendant
could have foreseen the harm.149 Only policy concerns, such as
those listed in the comments of Section 7,150 should drive a court
to reach a finding of no duty.151 Three states’ highest courts have
143. Id.
144. See id. (“[N]o-duty cases are narrow categorical exceptions to the
general duty rule.”).
145. See § 7(b) (stating that a court may find lack of duty only for
“articulated” policy reasons).
146. See, e.g., id. § 7 cmt. c (suggesting that courts make a no-duty
determination when the creation of a duty would conflict with social norms); id.
§ 7 cmt. d (suggesting that courts make a no-duty determination when a finding
of liability might “interfere with important principles reflected in another area
of law”); id. § 7 cmt. g (suggesting that courts make a no-duty determination
when the decision would be better resolved by officials from another branch of
government).
147. Id. § 7 reporters’ note; see also Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in
Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1247, 1248−49
(2009) (describing the goals of the Restatement’s drafters, known as Reporters,
with regards to the decreased role of foreseeability in the Third Restatement).
The Reporters “undercut” the role of foreseeability in duty analysis to bring
“conceptual integrity” to negligence law. Id. at 1249.
148. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 7(b) cmt. j
(2010) (stating that a court must justify a “no-duty” ruling “without obscuring
references to foreseeability”).
149. See id. (“These determinations are based on the specific facts of the
case, are applicable only to that case, and are appropriately cognizant of the role
of the jury in factual determinations.”); see also Zipursky, supra note 147, at
1251 (stating the Third Restatement proposes that the jury rather than the
judge must weigh the degree of foreseeability in determining liability).
150. See supra note 146 (listing examples of valid policy concerns).
151. See § 7(b) (allowing a court to find no duty when warranted by “an
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praised the analytical framework of Section 7 of the Third
Restatement and have expressly begun to apply it to negligence
cases.152
A. Support for Section 7
Courts and legal researchers who favor the application of the
Third Restatement to cases that require the determination of a
duty—such as take-home asbestos cases—support their position
with several rationales.153
1. The Elimination of Foreseeability from Duty Analysis
Advocates argue that because Section 7 eliminates
foreseeability as a factor in duty analysis, Section 7 structurally
surpasses the current approaches of most courts.154 The question
of duty is a matter of law, and when a court considers
foreseeability of harm, it brings “fact-specific inquiries” into its
duty analysis.155 Section 7 punts the consideration of
foreseeability to the jury where such factual concerns belong.156
articulated countervailing principle or policy”).
152. See, e.g., Gipson v. Kasey, 150 P.3d 228, 231 (Ariz. 2007) (citing to
Section 7 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts in its decision that “foreseeability
is not a factor to be considered by courts when making determinations of duty”);
Van Fossen v. MidAm. Energy Co., 777 N.W.2d 689, 696 (Iowa 2009) (applying
the Restatement (Third) of Torts § 7 framework, which the Supreme Court of
Iowa adopted in Thompson v. Kaczinski, to a secondhand asbestos case (citing
Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829, 834 (Iowa 2009))); A.W. v. Lancaster
Cnty. Sch. Dist., 784 N.W.2d 907, 918 (Neb. 2010) (agreeing with the Third
Restatement that juries should determine questions of foreseeability).
153. See, e.g., Kotlarsky, supra note 137, at 483−88 (arguing that the Third
Restatement provides a better analytical framework for duty determinations
than the approaches applied by most courts).
154. See Cardi, supra note 142, at 742 (“Should courts take Section 7 of the
proposed Restatement seriously, they will find that duty has been purged of
many of the problems caused by its current reliance on foreseeability.”).
155. Kotlarsky, supra note 137, at 484.
156. See id. at 486 (“The Third Restatement results in clearer duty
determinations . . . because . . . it leaves fact-specific inquiries like foreseeability
to the jury.”); cf. DOBBS, supra note 23, at 336 (“[T]he question of what is or is
not foreseeable to a reasonable person in the position of the defendant is
normally a jury question, part of its overall evaluation of the defendant’s
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Supporters of Section 7 contend that removing foreseeability
analysis from the court will also result in clearer precedents.157
Because foreseeability is “malleab[le],” courts’ examination of it
often “opens the way for like cases to be treated differently and
different cases to be treated alike.”158 By presuming that a duty of
reasonable care exists, Section 7 eliminates “murky legal
analysis” that results when courts struggle with foreseeability in
the process of determining the existence of duty.159 Instead,
Section 7 allows fact-finders to evaluate the specific facts of the
case and decide foreseeability in the context of breach.160
In A.W. v. Lancaster County School District,161 the Supreme
Court of Nebraska expressed these problems with using
foreseeability in duty analysis and decided to adopt the
Restatement (Third) of Torts, Section 7.162 The court stated that
foreseeability is a factual question, and “small changes in facts
may make a dramatic change in how much risk is foreseeable.”163
As such, the fact finder, not the court, must assess the
foreseeability of the risk at the time of the alleged negligence.164
conduct.”).
157. See Kotlarsky, supra 137, at 486 (“The Third Restatement makes
courts’ inquiries much simpler when they determine that a duty existed, which
results in clearer legal precedent.”); see also Cardi, supra note 142, at 794 (“By
imposing a duty whenever a defendant has created a risk of harm, the standard
for duty could not be more simple, clear, and predictable.”).
158. Cardi, supra note 142, at 792.
159. Kotlarsky, supra note 137, at 486.
160. See id. (arguing for a shift of foreseeability determinations from the
judge to the jury); see also Cardi, supra note 142, at 799 (reasoning that
foreseeability decisions should be left to the jury). Professor Cardi argues that
foreseeability determinations call for “common sense, common experience, and
application of the standards and behavioral norms of the community.” Id. The
judge’s understanding of community is often “frozen as precedent” and unable to
evolve as the community naturally changes. Id. at 800. On the other hand,
because current community members form a jury, a jury’s decision can “evolve
with changing cultural mores.” Id. at 801. As such, the citizens of that
community should make foreseeability judgments rather than the judge. Id.
161. 784 N.W.2d 907 (Neb. 2010).
162. See id. at 918 (adopting the duty analysis of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts § 7).
163. Id. at 917.
164. See id. at 918 (adopting the Third Restatement’s approach). By
reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the duty analysis it used in previous
cases. Id. at 916. For example, in Sharkey v. Board of Regents, the court relied
upon foreseeability in its determination that a university had a legal duty to
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The court did not think that adopting the Third Restatement’s
analysis would change the law of Nebraska.165 Rather, the court
said, the application of the Third Restatement simply
“rearrang[es] the basic questions that are posed by any
negligence case and mak[es] sure that each question has been put
in its proper place.”166
2. The Creation of Transparency in Court Opinions
A second benefit of resorting to Section 7 in duty
determination is greater transparency in a court’s decisionmaking process.167 Courts currently “couch” their policy
considerations
in
unnecessary
legal
doctrines
like
foreseeability.168 In In re New York City Asbestos Litigation,169 for
example, the New York Court of Appeals based its holding on
lack of relationship between the employer and the employee’s
wife.170 The court, however, spoke primarily about avoiding the
“specter of limitless liability” that could be invoked by
establishing a duty in the case.171 The court’s attachment to using
relationship analysis for determining duty disguised the policy
concerns that seemed to truly motivate the court’s decision.172
protect on-campus students from criminal activity. Id. (citing Sharkey v. Bd. of
Regents, 615 N.W.2d 889 (Neb. 2000)). In its A.W. opinion, the court asserted
that its reasoning in Sharkey—“that because the attack at issue . . . was
foreseeable, the defendant had a duty to protect against foreseeable acts of
violence”—was “tautological.” Id.
165. See id. at 917−18 (“We do not view our endorsement of the Restatement
(Third) as a fundamental change in our law.”).
166. Id. at 918.
167. See Kotlarsky, supra note 137, at 485 (arguing that the Third
Restatement will result in greater transparency in take-home asbestos cases).
168. Id.; see also Cardi, supra note 142, at 766 (arguing that the doctrine of
foreseeability allows a court to “skirt[ ] the policy decisions inherent in certain
types of negligence cases”).
169. 840 N.E.2d 115 (N.Y. 2005).
170. See id. at 122 (“Here, there is no relationship between the Port
Authority and Elizabeth Holdampf.”).
171. Id. (citation omitted).
172. See Kotlarsky, supra note 137, at 485 (“These doctrines [of nonfeasance,
lack of a relationship between the parties, and lack of foreseeability of harm to
the plaintiff] obfuscate the policy decisions that truly inform courts’
determinations.”).
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Supporters of the Third Restatement maintain that because
Section 7(b) requires courts to expressly state their policy reasons
for not imposing a duty on the defendant,173 it is superior to the
application of foreseeability and other negligence doctrines.174
Foreseeability “masks” the resolution of policy issues,175 resulting
in confusion and lack of transparency.176 Section 7, however,
“encourages judges to be transparent in their reasons for
declining to impose a duty, rather than to rely on the screen of
foreseeability.”177
In Gipson v. Kasey,178 the Supreme Court of Arizona noted
the conflict between using foreseeability and maintaining
transparency in duty analysis.179 The court worried that relying
on notions like foreseeability could “obscure the factors that
actually guide courts in recognizing duties,” such as public policy
considerations.180 Realizing the “confusion and lack of clarity”
existing in its own case law, the court decided that it should not
consider foreseeability when making determinations of duty and
rejected its prior opinions suggesting the contrary.181
B. Criticisms of Section 7
The Gipson and A.W. decisions, along with several legal
scholars, favor the analysis delineated in Section 7.182 Not all

173. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 7(b) (2010)
(requiring a court to “articulate[ ]” its policy reasons for not finding a duty of
care in a specific case).
174. See, e.g., Cardi, supra note 142, at 767 (arguing that the use of
foreseeability in determining duty “distracts from” the “resolution of important
policy concerns” and “endangers courts’ legitimacy”).
175. Id.
176. See Kotlarsy, supra note 137, at 485 (“When courts expressly state their
policy reasons instead of engaging in multi-factored tests, they contribute to
greater transparency in take-home asbestos cases.”).
177. Cardi, supra note 142, at 794.
178. 150 P.3d 228 (Ariz. 2007).
179. See id. at 231 (discounting the use of foreseeability in duty analysis).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the benefits of Section 7).
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courts and legal commentators, however, support the Third
Restatement’s approach to duty determination.183
1. Failure to Reflect the Predominant Judicial Approach
By eliminating foreseeability from courts’ determinations of
whether a duty exists, Professor Benjamin C. Zipursky argues
that the Reporters have countered the predominant judicial
approach.184 A Restatement should summarize the law in a
general area, describe the ways in which it is evolving, and
propose the authors’ opinions on how it should change.185 In
Section 7 of the Third Restatement, however, the Reporters have
not adhered to these objectives.186
Almost every jurisdiction—Professor Zipursky’s article from
2009 found forty-seven jurisdictions, but since then, the number
has decreased to forty-five—considers foreseeability in its
determination of the existence of duty in a negligence claim.187
183. See Tesar v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 351, 358 n.13 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010)
(referring to the Third Restatement’s approach for determining duty as a
“nightmare”).
184. See Zipursky, supra note 147, at 1257 (noting that the Third
Restatement fails to concede that its rejection of foreseeability is contrary to
most states’ negligence law).
185. See Tesar, 789 N.W.2d at 358 n.13 (explaining the goal of the
Restatement (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1314−15 (7th ed. 1999))).
186. See id. (questioning the Third Restatement’s disapproval of the
widespread use of foreseeability in duty determination).
187. See Zipursky, supra note 147, at 1260 (“The reality . . . is that fortyseven states plainly do give foreseeability a significant role in duty analysis.”).
In 2009, only New York, Arizona, and Washington seemed to reject
foreseeability as a component of duty analysis. Id. The New York Court of
Appeals refused to consider foreseeability of injury in a secondhand asbestos
case. See In re N.Y.C. Abestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115, 119 (N.Y. 2005)
(“[F]oreseeability bears on the scope of a duty, not whether a duty exists in the
first place.”). In Gipson v. Kasey, the Supreme Court of Arizona expressly held
that courts should not consider foreseeability when making duty
determinations. Gipson v. Kasey, 150 P.3d 228, 231 (Ariz. 2007). Finally, in
Simonetta v. Viad Corp., the Supreme Court of Washington stated that
foreseeability of harm does not imply the existence of duty. Simonetta v. Viad
Corp., 197 P.3d 127, 131 n.4 (Wash. 2008). Now, it seems that Iowa has joined
this group of jurisdictions expelling foreseeability from duty determinations. See
Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829, 835 (Iowa 2009) (removing
foreseeability from determination of duty). Nebraska has conformed to this
reasoning as well. See A.W. v. Lancaster Cnty. Sch. Dist., 784 N.W.2d 907, 918
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American courts have “overwhelmingly embraced [foreseeability]
as a vitally important part of duty.”188 In fact, many courts view
foreseeability as the most important factor.189 The Third
Restatement, however, ignores the near unanimous judicial use
of foreseeability in duty analysis.190 Additionally, the American
Law Institute drafted the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability
for Physical and Emotional Harm over a dozen years ago191 and
published the first volume in 2005.192 Yet between 1998 and the
date of this Note’s submission, only five states have employed the
analysis on duty proposed in Section 7.193 Two states, Delaware194
(Neb. 2010) (“We expressly hold that foreseeability is not a factor to be
considered by courts when making determinations of duty.”).
Dobbs suggests that courts’ practice of deciding factual issues such as
foreseeability conflicts with “traditional” negligence analysis. See DOBBS, supra
note 23, at 584−85. This is because of the inconsistent use of terminology in
reference to proximate cause. Id. at 484. While foreseeability “traditional[ly]”
falls within proximate cause analysis and is a factual determination for the jury,
courts often choose to phrase proximate cause questions in the language of duty.
Id. As such, the court reserves the negligence decision for its own determination
rather than the jury’s. Id. at 484−85. In other words, when courts phrase the
negligence question as one of duty, as many courts do, “the judge, not the jury,
will be the decision maker, even on such quintessential jury issues as
foreseeability.” Id. at 583.
188. See Zipursky, supra note 147, at 1263.
189. See, e.g., Chaisson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 947 So. 2d 171, 183 (La. Ct.
App. 2006) (relying “heavily” upon foreseeability when finding a duty); Olivo v.
Owens-Ill., Inc., 895 A.2d 1143, 1148 (N.J. 2006) (“Because the focus here is on
the determination of a duty, foreseeability of harm weighs in that analysis as a
crucial element in determining whether imposition of a duty on an alleged
tortfeasor is appropriate.” (citations omitted)); Alcoa, Inc. v. Behringer, 235
S.W.3d 456, 460 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (reciting foreseeability as the “foremost
consideration” in determining whether a defendant is under a legal duty);
Marcus v. Staubs, No. 11-0994, 2012 WL 5834579, at *9 (W. Va. Nov. 15, 2012)
(“The ultimate test of the existence of a duty to use care is found in the
foreseeability that harm may result if it is not exercised.” (citation omitted)).
190. See Zipursky, supra note 147, at 1259 (highlighting that the Third
Restatement “neglects the predominance” of foreseeability in the law of the
states).
191. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM
(BASIC PRINCIPLES) (Preliminary Draft No. 1, 1998).
192. See generally 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM
(2005).
193. See supra note 187 and accompanying text (listing the state cases in
which the court applied the duty analysis suggested by Section 7 of the Third
Restatement).
194. See Riedel v. ICI Ams. Inc., 968 A.2d 17, 20 (Del. 2009) (“At this time,
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and Wisconsin,195 have explicitly rejected the adoption of the
Third Restatement’s concept of duty. Therefore, considering the
overwhelming application of foreseeability in duty analysis196 and
some courts’ strong rejection of the Third Restatement, the
possibility of jurisdictions shifting to the Third Restatement’s
approach to duty in negligence cases is unrealistic.
2. Failure to Acknowledge the Link Between Foreseeability and
Public Policy Considerations
While the Third Restatement suggests that courts turn away
from foreseeability and toward policy considerations,197 Professor
Zipursky argues that examining policy requires awareness of
foreseeability in itself.198 He presents Tarasoff v. Regents of
we decline to adopt any sections of the Restatement (Third) of Torts.”). In
Riedel, the Supreme Court of Delaware refused to adopt the Third Restatement
because its drafters “redefined the concept of duty in a way that is inconsistent
with [the Supreme Court of Delaware’s] precedents and traditions.” Id. The
court criticized the Third Restatement’s creation of duty in circumstances when
it is the court’s practice to defer to the legislature for duty decisions. Id.
Recognizing the “primacy of the legislative branch” in resolving social policy
issues, the court decided to continue following the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. Id. at 21.
195. See Tesar v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 351, 358 n.13 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010)
(stating that under Wisconsin jurisprudence, “duty and foreseeability are
inexorably intertwined” (citing Hocking v. City of Dodgeville, 768 N.W.2d 552,
556 (Wis. 2009))). Wisconsin finds a lack of duty only “where no reasonable jury
could find foreseeability.” Id. The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin criticized the
Third Restatement because its “excision of foreseeability” essentially “eliminates
duty in Wisconsin’s negligence methodology.” Id. The court stated that
Wisconsin has been using foreseeability in its duty analysis for seventy-five
years, and the approach has proved successful. Id. Section 7(a) of the Third
Restatement creates a “duty to the world” without consideration of the facts of
the case or the attenuated allegations of the plaintiff. Id. The court rejected this
ideology, affirming the place of duty in Wisconsin’s negligence analysis and
finding that the consideration of foreseeability in a specific case is necessary to
determine whether a defendant had a duty. Id.
196. See Cardi, supra note 142, at 804 (“[F]or most jurisdictions the
Restatement Third’s proposal will represent a significant doctrinal change.”).
197. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 7 cmt. j
(2010) (disapproving of the use of foreseeability in duty determinations and
requiring courts to explain no-duty rulings using policy or principle concerns).
198. See Zipursky, supra note 147, at 1263 (describing the interaction
between considerations of policy and foreseeability).
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University of California199 to illustrate this aspect of the Third
Restatement.200 In Tarasoff, the Supreme Court of California held
that a psychotherapist has a duty to warn a potential victim of a
patient’s threats when such disclosure is essential for the welfare
of the victim.201 The court reasoned that averting harm to others
outweighs the public policy of protecting confidentiality between
a psychotherapist and his patient.202 Professor Zipursky argues
that to arrive at this policy decision, the court had to engage in
questions of foreseeability.203 A duty arises only when the
psychotherapist can foresee the injury to a third-party victim.204
Consequently, despite the express elimination of foreseeability in
Section 7 of the Third Restatement, courts applying Section 7 will
still have to consider the foreseeability of harm when evaluating
possible policy considerations.205

199. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
200. See Zipursky, supra note 147, at 1263 (using Tarasoff to illustrate that
courts consider foreseeability to support policy decisions).
201. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 347 (holding that a psychotherapist must
disclose communications with his patient if it is essential to avoid danger to
others).
202. See id. at 442 (“We conclude that the public policy favoring protection of
the confidential character of patient-psychotherapist communications must
yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others. The
protective privilege ends where the public peril begins.”).
203. See Zipursky, supra note 147, at 1263 (“[T]he capacity of
psychotherapists to foresee injury to third-party victims is part of the policy
decision.”).
204. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 345
[O]nce a therapist does in fact determine, or under applicable
professional standards reasonably should have determined, that a
patient poses a serious danger of violence to others, he bears a duty to
exercise reasonable care to protect the foreseeable victim of that
danger . . . . [T]he discharge of this duty of due care will necessarily
vary with the facts of each case . . . .
205. See Zipursky, supra note 147, at 1263 (arguing that the court will have
to determine whether or not the defendant foresaw the harm to the plaintiff,
even under Section 7 of the Third Restatement).
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C. The Problems with Applying Section 7 to Take-Home Asbestos
Exposure Cases
Applying Professor Zipursky’s concerns in the context of
take-home asbestos exposure demonstrates that the Third
Restatement’s approach to duty is not satisfactory. Section 7
interferes with the purpose of motions for summary judgment,
and it places public policy decisions in the wrong hands.
1. Section 7’s Interference with Motions for Summary Judgment
In nearly every take-home asbestos case, the defendant
initially moves for summary judgment, arguing that it owes no
duty to the plaintiff, an individual with whom it has no legal
relationship and whose exposure occurred off of the defendant’s
premises.206 If the trial court grants a motion for summary
judgment, finding that the defendant owed no duty to the
plaintiff, then, unless the plaintiff appeals, the case closes.207
Thus, the motion for summary judgment allows the court to

206. See, e.g., Martin v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 561 F.3d 439, 443 (6th
Cir. 2009) (reviewing the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the
defendant); Catania v. Anco Insulations, Inc., No. 05-1418-JJB, 2009 WL
3855468, at *1 (M.D. La. Nov. 17, 2009) (ruling on defendant’s motion for
summary judgment on the theory that defendant owed no duty of care to
plaintiff); Nelson v. Aurora Equip. Co., 909 N.E.2d 931, 933 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)
(reviewing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant
who argued that it owed no duty to the wife of an employee); Van Fossen v.
MidAm. Energy Co., 777 N.W.2d 689, 692 (Iowa 2009) (reviewing the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants who argued that
they owed no duty to the plaintiff); Olivo v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 895 A.2d 1143,
1146−47 (N.J. 2006) (reviewing the defendant’s motion for summary judgment
in which it argued that it owed no duty to an employee’s wife); In re N.Y.C.
Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115, 117−18 (N.Y. 2005) (hearing an appeal on the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment in which it argued it owed no duty to
the plaintiff); Hudson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., No. 1991-C-2078, 1995 WL
17778064, at *1 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Dec. 12, 1995) (determining the validity of the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on lack of duty); Rochon v.
Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., 140 Wash. App. 1008, at *1 (2007) (reconsidering the
trial court’s grant of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment).
207. See Kyle M. Robertson, No More Litigation Gambles: Toward a New
Summary Judgment, 28 B.C. L. REV. 747, 747 (1987) (“Where the defendant is
the moving party, the grant of a summary judgment motion relieves the
defendant from the burden of trial.”).
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“eliminat[e] unnecessary litigation.”208 Factually deficient claims
can be “isolated and prevented from going to trial,” avoiding the
“unwarranted consumption of public and private resources.”209
The courts should embrace this purpose of summary judgment in
asbestos cases, given the tens of billions of dollars already spent
in asbestos litigation.210
Viewing take-home asbestos cases in their usual procedural
posture illustrates the flaws of the Third Restatement. On a
motion for summary judgment based on lack of duty, Section 7,
which presumes the existence of duty, requires the court to
dismiss the motion unless it is willing to wrestle with policy
determinations.211 As such, a motion for summary judgment
centered on the absence of duty will succeed only in exceptional
cases.212 In fact, each court that has applied Section 7 to review
motions for summary judgment has denied the motion, finding
that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff and that the jury
should hear the case.213
208. Id. at 747–48.
209. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986); see also Witter v.
Abell-Howe Co., 765 F. Supp. 1144, 1147 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (directing courts to
not be “reluctant to grant summary judgment in appropriate cases” because
“[o]ne of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and
dispose of factually unsupported claims” (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323−24)).
Summary judgment permits courts “to avoid ‘protracted, expensive and
harassing trials.’” Id. (quoting Meiri v. Dacon, 749 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829 (1985)).
210. See CARROLL, ET AL., supra note 4 and accompanying text (stating that
over $70 billion has been spent on asbestos litigation).
211. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 7 (2010)
(assuming the existence of a duty and allowing the court to find against duty
only when warranted by “countervailing principle or policy”).
212. See id. (suggesting courts to make “no duty” decisions based on policy
concerns only in “exceptional cases”); Kotlarsky, supra note 137, at 487 (“The
Third Restatement . . . will likely lead to fewer ‘no duty’ holdings.”).
213. See Sage v. Blagg Appraisal Co., 209 P.3d 169, 176 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009)
(reversing the judgment of the lower court and holding that an “appraiser
retained by a lender in connection with a purchase-money mortgage transaction
owes a duty of care to the borrower who is the prospective buyer of the home to
be appraised”). Though the court did not apply Section 7 in its analysis, the
court noted that it would reach the same conclusion under the Third
Restatement, seeing no countervailing public policy reasons to reject the duty.
Id. at 175 n.9; see also Gipson v. Casey, 150 P.3d 228, 232−34 (Ariz. 2007)
(reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and using Section 7 to
conclude that a duty is created when a person who has been prescribed drugs
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Courts should utilize summary judgment motions to “assess
the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for
trial.”214 The assumption of duty required under Section 7(a),
however, bars courts from reviewing the record for a “genuine
issue of material fact”215 on the existence of duty and limits courts
to policy considerations.216 As a result, Section 7 undermines the
purpose of summary judgment: justice and efficiency.217 Given the
emphasis placed on motion practice in civil litigation,218 the Third
Restatement’s shortcomings in this regard are significant.
If courts can use foreseeability in their review of motions for
summary judgment, however, they can better identify the cases
that require a jury’s consideration. In Tesar v. Anderson,219 the
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin alluded to this point. The court
stated that it can maintain the proper roles of the judge and the
jury without entirely eliminating foreseeability as the Third
Restatement does.220 Wisconsin’s practice allows the court to find
a lack of duty only where “no reasonable jury could find
improperly distributes the drugs to others); Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d
829, 840 (Iowa 2009) (finding that the lower court erred in concluding that the
defendants owed no duty to the plaintiff to avoid the placement of obstructions
on a roadway). Finding no policy justifying a departure from this duty, as
required by Section 7 for no-duty determinations, the court reversed the lower
court’s grant of summary judgment. Id. at 835; see also A.W. v. Lancaster Cnty.
Sch. Dist., 784 N.W.2d 907, 918–19 (Neb. 2010) (adopting Section 7 and
determining that the public school system owed a duty protect the students from
sexual assault in the school building and no countervailing principle or policy
warrants modification of that duty). Thus, the Supreme Court of Nebraska held
that summary judgment was improper. Id. at 920.
214. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
TO CERTAIN RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS,
31 F.R.D. 621, 648 (1962).
215. FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see also, e.g., DEL. CT. C.P.R. 56 (granting a motion
for summary judgment if there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact”);
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 2-1005(c) (West 1985) (same); N.J. STAT ANN.
§ 4:46-2 (West 1998) (same).
216. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 7(b) (2010)
(allowing a court to find the absence of a duty only for policy reasons).
217. See supra notes 207–09 and accompanying text (defining the purpose of
summary judgment).
218. See Morton Denlow, Justice Should Emphasize People, Not Paper, 83
JUDICATURE 50, 90 (1999) (discussing the growth of motion practice).
219. 789 N.W.2d 351 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010).
220. See id. at 358 n.13 (disagreeing with the Third Restatement’s
establishment of “categories of duty” with “exceptions to those categories”).
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foreseeability.”221 To make this determination, the court must
conduct at least a cursory examination of the facts and
circumstances of the case before it.222 If the court can review the
facts on a summary judgment motion to determine the
foreseeability of the injury, then judicial economy—the drive of
the summary judgment rule223—can be better served.
This is especially true for take-home asbestos cases, in which
the existence of duty frequently depends on the date on which the
plaintiff’s asbestos exposure occurred.224 If the exposure occurred
prior to the date on which the asbestos industry knew of the
dangers of non-occupational exposure, then it is reasonable to
conclude that the defendant could not have foreseen that one of
its employee’s family members would suffer an asbestos-related
injury.225 If a judge can reach this conclusion based on the facts
221. Id. Section 7 of the Third Restatement contains similar language. See
§ 7 cmt. j (2010) (“[C]ourts should leave [foreseeability] determinations to juries
unless no reasonable person could differ on the matter.”). Yet the Wisconsin
court still discounts the presumption of duty in Section 7(a), stating that a duty
does not always exist “in any case where negligence is asserted . . . no matter
what the facts of the case reveal or how fanciful are the plaintiff’s allegations.”
Tesar, 789 N.W.2d at 358 n.13. Wisconsin’s approach is not as presumptive as
the Third Restatement’s, finding duty only if it is foreseeable that the
defendant’s act “might cause injury or damage to someone.” Id. at 363.
222. See Tesar, 789 N.W.2d at 358 n.13 (reaffirming duty as an element in
Wisconsin’s negligence methodology and stating that duty must be determined
according to the “facts and circumstances pled or proven”).
223. See Exxon Corp. v. Nat’l Foodline Corp., 579 F.2d 1244, 1246 (C.C.P.A.
1978) (verifying that the “basic” purpose of summary judgment is “judicial
economy to save the time and expense of a full trial when it is unnecessary
because the essential facts necessary to decision of the issue can be adequately
developed by less costly procedures . . . with a net benefit to society”).
224. See supra notes 40–56 and accompanying text (illustrating the cases in
which the court compared the date on which the plaintiff’s asbestos-injury
occurred with the industry’s understanding of asbestos at that time).
225. See, e.g., Alcoa, Inc. v. Behringer, 235 S.W.3d 456, 460−61 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2007) (considering whether an “ordinary employer that used, but did not
manufacture, asbestos” could have foreseen the risk for illness posed by nonoccupational exposure to asbestos in the 1950s when the plaintiff’s exposure
occurred). The court concluded, based on the evidence presented on the matter,
that “non-occupational exposure to asbestos dust on workers’ clothes was
neither known nor reasonable foreseeable” to the defendant at that time. Id. at
462. Because foreseeability is the “foremost and dominant consideration in a
legal duty analysis,” the court held, as a matter of law, that the defendant did
not owe a duty to the wife of an employee when the asbestos exposure occurred
in the 1950s. Id. (citation omitted).
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entered with a motion for summary judgment, then the judge
should be able to grant the motion—assuming the only disputed
issue is duty—without considering policy.226 In this way, a court
can quickly eliminate “factually unsupported claims.”227
2. The Stalemate of Competing Public Policies in Take-Home
Asbestos Exposure
Requiring courts to engage in public policy considerations
before making a “no duty” decision raises an additional problem
with the application of Section 7 to take-home asbestos exposure
cases, namely that these cases often involve competing social
policies.228 On the one hand, extending an employer’s duty to the
family members of his employees “saddles the defendant
employer with a burden of uncertain but potentially very large
scope.”229 If courts hold employers liable for harm resulting from
asbestos fibers spreading from a worker’s clothing, the number of
potential plaintiffs becomes boundless, encompassing all who

226. See DOBBS, supra note 23, at 335−36 (acknowledging that in some
cases, the reasonable foreseeability of harm “is a call that is easy to make and so
clear that courts will brook no argument”). Note that experts have not yet
unanimously verified the date on which the asbestos industry became aware of
the danger of asbestos and the risk of take-home exposure. See supra notes 57–
63 and accompanying text (illustrating courts’ various accounts of when the
risks of asbestos became widely known). Compare Condon v. Union Oil Co., No.
A102069, 2004 WL 1932847, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2004) (reviewing
expert testimony that explained that the danger of take-home asbestos was not
known until the 1970s), with Catania v. Anco Insulations, Inc., No. 05-1418JJB, 2009 WL 3855468, at *2 (M.D. La. Nov. 17, 2009) (concluding that in 1951,
when the Walsh−Healey Act was passed, “the risks of asbestos, including risks
from employees carrying it home on clothing, were foreseeable”).
At summary judgment, if the evidence admitted by the parties suggests a
disputed timeline, then the judge should not grant the motion for summary
judgment because a “genuine issue of material fact” exists. FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see
also supra note 215 (listing statutes that conform to the language of the federal
rule on summary judgment motions). For a current description on when and
how the risks of take-home asbestos came to be understood, see Donovan et al.,
supra note 60, at 703−31.
227. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323−24 (1986).
228. See supra note 135 (comparing the pertinent social policies involved
with secondhand asbestos).
229. Campbell v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 403 (Ct. App. 2012).
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come into contact with the employee while he is wearing his work
clothes outside of the workplace.230
On the other hand, society would benefit from ensuring that
“corporations are held accountable for the consequences [of] their
processes.”231 Research demonstrates the extreme toxicity of
asbestos and the detrimental effects it has on the health of
humans.232 In fact, asbestos has caused what is considered “the
worst occupational health disaster in U.S. history.”233 The
dangerous nature of asbestos has led to calls for imposing a duty
on employers to protect employees, as well as their families, from
its fatal effects.234
Arguably, courts are not the most competent body to decide
which of these strong policy considerations should prevail.235
Indeed, courts might not want to delve into public policy when
230. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams, 608 S.E.2d 208, 209 (Ga. 2005)
(declining to expand recovery “beyond manageable bounds and create an almost
indefinite universe of potential plaintiffs” (citation omitted)); In re N.Y.C.
Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115, 122 (N.Y. 2005) (worrying about the “specter of
limitless liability” (citation omitted)).
231. In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of Tex., 740
N.W.2d 206, 229 (Mich. 2007) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).
232. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER, WILLIAM L.F. FELSTINER, MOLLY SELVIN &
PATRICIA A. EBENER, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS:
THE CHALLENGE OF MASS TOXIC TORTS 1 (1985) (estimating the range of deaths
due to asbestos exposure through the year 2000 to range from between 200,000
and 450,000). For more information on the health effects of asbestos, see
AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR ASBESTOS (Sept. 2001),
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/ToxProfiles/tp61.pdf.
233. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 18, at 16 (citation omitted).
234. See In re Certified Question, 740 N.W.2d at 233−34 (“The severely
dangerous character of asbestos should factor much more heavily in the analysis
of whether defendant had a duty to mitigate the risk involved.”); Satterfield v.
Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 374 (Tenn. 2008)
[I]n light of the magnitude of the potential harm from exposure to
asbestos and the means available to prevent or reduce this harm, we
see no reason to prevent carpool members, babysitters, or the
domestic help from pursuing negligence claims against an employer
should they develop mesothelioma after being repeatedly and
regularly in close contact with an employee’s asbestos-contaminated
work clothes over an extended period of time.
235. John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third)
and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 750 (2001)
(arguing that courts may not be “especially competent” to make “large-scale
policy judgments”).
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determining the existence of a duty.236 Because Section 7(b)
insists that courts support their no-duty decisions with public
policy rationales, it is not the best approach to take-home
asbestos exposure cases.
IV. Suggested Approaches to Handling Take-Home Asbestos
Exposure Cases
With regard to cases alleging secondhand exposure to
asbestos, and perhaps cases involving the existence of duty in
general, courts are inundated with a plethora of relevant
considerations, each leading them toward different conclusions.
Essentially, the holdings on the existence of duty in these cases
turn on courts’ precedential common law of torts.237 Some states
principally focus on foreseeability,238 while other states consider
the relationship between the parties as most important.239 Still
others base their holdings primarily on public policy concerns.240
Section 7 of the Third Restatement fails to take into account the
reality that states do not weigh factors in the same manner.241
This Part argues that a multi-factor test, such as that used by the

236. See supra note 194 (describing the Supreme Court of Delaware’s
hesitancy to engage in policy analysis); Cardi, supra note 142, at 763 (“Many
courts feel squeamish about deciding tort cases on the basis of reasoning that is
arguably proper only for the legislative branch.”).
237. See supra Part II (presenting state courts’ various approaches to duty
analysis in the context of take-home asbestos exposure).
238. See supra Part II.A (naming the courts that use foreseeability of harm
in their duty analysis); see, e.g., Olivo v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 895 A.2d 1143, 1148
(N.J. 2006) (considering foreseeability of harm as a “crucial element” in
determining whether a duty should be imposed on the defendant).
239. See supra Part II.B (naming the courts that consider the relationship
between the defendant and the plaintiff in their duty analysis); see, e.g., In re
N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115, 119 (N.Y. 2005) (stating that the
defendant’s relationship with the plaintiff is the “key” consideration to the
existence of duty).
240. See, e.g., In re Certified Question from the Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of
Tex., 740 N.W.2d 206, 211 (Mich. 2007) (stating that the “ultimate inquiry” in
duty analysis involves the balance of policy considerations).
241. See supra Part III.B (recognizing that the Third Restatement’s focus on
public policy and elimination of foreseeability conflicts with the current practice
of most states).
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Delaware court in In re Asbestos Litigation,242 most appropriately
handles take-home asbestos exposure cases because it allows
states to weigh factors in accordance with their body of common
law while maintaining sufficient uniformity in outcome across the
country.243 Though offering a judicial approach, this section
ultimately asserts that the problem of take-home asbestos
exposure is best suited for the legislature.244
A. Judicial Solution: The Multi-Factored Test
In determining whether a premise owner or employer owes a
duty in the context of take-home asbestos exposure, many states
apply some form of a factored test, though one state might weigh
a factor more heavily than another state.245 While the relevant
considerations vary among the states, the courts commonly hold
four specific factors as important in duty analysis: the
foreseeability of harm, the relationship between the parties, the
burden that creating a duty will place on the defendant, and
public policy considerations.246 None of these factors alone
suffices to establish a duty.247 Considering them together in the
242. See supra notes 82–92 and accompanying text (discussing the factored
analysis applied by the Delaware Court in In re Asbestos Litigation).
243. See infra Part IV.A (proposing a multi-factored test for determining
duty in secondhand asbestos cases).
244. See infra Part IV.B (suggesting that state legislatures should take
responsibility for handling this issue).
245. See supra notes 79–80 (listing some cases that have handled duty using
balancing tests).
246. See, e.g., Campbell v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 398 (Ct.
App. 2012) (considering each of these factors as part of its duty analysis); In re
Asbestos Litig., C.A. No. N10C-04-203 ASB, 2012 WL 1413887, at *2 (Del.
Super. Ct. Feb. 21, 2012) (same); Simpkins v. CSX Transp., Inc., 965 N.E.2d
1092, 1097 (Ill. 2012) (same); Chaisson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 947 So. 2d 171,
181−83 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (same); In re Certified Question from Fourteenth
Dist. Ct. App. of Tex., 740 N.W.2d 206, 216−20 (Mich. 2007) (same); Olivo v.
Owens-Ill., Inc., 895 A.2d 1143, 1147−49 (N.J. 2006) (same); In re N.Y.C.
Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115, 119−22 (N.Y. 2005); Satterfield v. Breeding
Insulation Co. 266 S.W.3d 347, 366 (Tenn. 2008) (same); Alcoa, Inc. v.
Behringer, 235 S.W.3d 456, 460 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (same).
247. See Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co. 266 S.W.3d 347, 366 (Tenn.
2008) (“[F]orseeability alone is insufficient to create a duty.”); In re Certified
Question from Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of Tex., 740 N.W.2d 206, 212 (Mich.
2007) (“[E]ven when there is a relationship between the parties, a legal duty
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context of take-home asbestos exposure, however, addresses the
issues that the Third Restatement overlooks while furthering the
interests that the Third Restatement views as important.
First, maintaining foreseeability of harm as a factor in duty
analysis conforms to the practice of most states, while the
approach of Section 7 diverges from this consensus.248 Placing the
foreseeability factor within a balancing test allows each state to
assess it according to its tort law rather than eliminating
foreseeability as a factor altogether.249 Louisiana, for example,
“relie[s] heavily upon foreseeability when finding a duty.”250 As
such, if it were to apply a factor-balancing test, a Louisiana court
would predominantly consider whether or not the defendant
could have foreseen the asbestos-related injuries caused through
secondhand exposure based on the information available to it at
the time.251 In Michigan, however, the relationship between the
parties controls the finding of a duty.252 Thus, in approaching a
take-home asbestos exposure case using a factor-balancing test, a
Michigan court would not look to the foreseeability factor unless
it first found a legally significant relationship between the
defendant and the plaintiff.253
Second, even if a court does not heavily weigh the
foreseeability of harm, preserving it as a factor in duty analysis
will allow courts to quickly eliminate factually deficient cases at
summary judgment.254 As discussed supra, the date on which the
does not necessarily exist . . . . [T]he other enumerated factors must also be
considered.”).
248. See supra notes 187–89 and accompanying text (discussing the
overwhelming use among the states of foreseeability of harm in duty analysis).
249. See supra note 147 and accompanying test (explaining the Third
Restatement’s omission of foreseeability).
250. Chaisson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 947 So. 2d 171, 183 (La. Ct. App.
2006).
251. See id. (considering what a reasonable company would have known
regarding the hazards of household exposure to asbestos at the time of the
plaintiff’s injury).
252. See In re Certified Question, 740 N.W.2d at 216 (stating that
relationship between the parties is the “most important prong in this state” for
duty determination).
253. See id. at 222 (“Because any relationship between Miller and the
defendant was highly tenuous, the harm was, in all likelihood, not
foreseeable . . . , [so] we conclude that a legal duty should not be imposed.”).
254. See supra notes 211–17 and accompanying text (evaluating the
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secondhand exposure occurred is relevant in determining
whether the employer owed a duty to prevent that exposure.255
According to a recent evaluation of secondhand asbestos
exposure, the first case reports on the possible risk of asbestosrelated disease caused by household contacts emerged in the
1960s.256 Using this evidence, a court could rule in favor of the
defendant on the issue of duty without resorting to a jury when
both parties agree that the plaintiff’s take-home exposure to
asbestos occurred in the early 1950s, before the risk of nonoccupational exposure was realized.257
In Hudson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,258 for example, a trial
court in Pennsylvania decided a motion for summary judgment
on this basis.259 In its decision, the court relied on a report
entered by the plaintiff as an exhibit in her response to the
motion for summary judgment.260 The report included only one
source, published in 1965, which addressed non-occupational
exposure to asbestos.261 As such, nothing in the record
demonstrated that the defendant was “on notice, prior to 1960,”
that an employee’s wife was at risk of contracting
mesothelioma.262 Because the plaintiff’s exposure began in 1930,
the court ruled in favor of the defendant on the motion for
summary judgment.263
importance of foreseeability in determining take-home asbestos cases at
summary judgment).
255. See supra notes 40–56 (discussing cases in which the court analyzed the
date of exposure in its duty analysis).
256. See Donovan et al., supra note 60, at 707 (discussing the existing
research on disease in household contacts of persons who worked with asbestos
occupationally).
257. See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text (referring to Alcoa, Inc.
v. Behringer, a case in which the court applied this reasoning).
258. No. 1991-C-2078, 1995 WL 17778064 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Dec. 12, 1995).
259. See id. at *1 (reviewing a motion for summary judgment filed by the
employer based on the theory that it owed no duty to the plaintiff, the wife of
the defendant’s employee).
260. See id. at *4 n.6 (noting that the report on which the court relied was
attached to the plaintiff’s response to summary judgment as an exhibit).
261. See id. at *4 (describing the report prepared for the plaintiff by Dr.
David Parkinson).
262. Id.
263. See id. (granting Bethlehem Steel Corporation’s motion for summary
judgment on the negligence theory because the plaintiff was not a “foreseeable
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Hudson demonstrates a court’s ability to fairly decide a takehome asbestos exposure case at summary judgment when the
parties have entered this type of chronological evidence. Without
contemplation of foreseeability, the court could not have made
this call.264 Under the Third Restatement, the court would have
been forced to presumptively find that a duty existed, despite the
clear factual evidence submitted by the parties proving that, at
the time, the defendant could not have known of any exposure
risks to nonemployees.265 Requiring a court to engage in at least
limited foreseeability analysis under a multi-factor balancing test
will result in the elimination of “easy” cases at summary
judgment, leaving the more difficult cases for the jury.266 This
approach, therefore, addresses the concerns of the Third
Restatement Reporters267 as well as the goals of summary
judgment268: it preserves the roles of the jury and judge, leaving
the factually ambiguous cases to the fact finders, while ensuring
that the tool of summary judgment is available to wisely manage
judicial resources.
Finally, the multi-factored test preserves the Third
Restatement’s public policy evaluation in duty analysis.269
victim of the asbestos-containing products utilized by Bethlehem Steel at the
time periods in issue”).
264. See id. at *3 (finding for the defendant because the evidence failed to
demonstrate that the defendant should have foreseen that a “passive recipient”
like the plaintiff could experience the hazards associated with asbestos
products).
265. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 7 cmt. j
(2010) (stating that a court must justify a “no-duty” ruling “without obscuring
references to foreseeability”); Kotlarsky, supra note 137, at 460 (describing the
presumptive nature of Section 7(a) of the Third Restatement).
266. See DOBBS, supra note 23, at 335−36 (noting that in some cases, the
reasonable foreseeability of harm “is a call that is easy to make and so clear that
courts will brook no argument”). Dobbs states that “aside from the easy cases,
the question of what is or is not foreseeable to a reasonable person in the
position of the defendant is normally a jury question, part of its overall
evaluation of the defendant’s conduct.” Id. at 336.
267. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (describing the Third
Restatement’s concern that using foreseeability in duty analysis blurs the line
between the role of the judge and the jury).
268. See supra notes 207–09 and accompanying text (highlighting the
purpose of summary judgment).
269. See § 7(b) (allowing a no-duty determination only for reasons based on
policy); id. (Reporters’ Note) (“Avoiding reliance on unforeseeability as a ground
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Making public policy an explicit prong in a factored test
addresses the Third Restatement’s concern with lack of
transparency.270 A test that examines four specific factors—
foreseeability, relationship, burden, and public policy—provides
the court with sufficient opportunity to fully and plainly explain
its decision for the benefit of both future litigants and other
courts.271 But unlike Section 7, which focuses solely on public
policy, the multi-factored test gives each court the flexibility to
implement its state’s common law on torts and to adhere to its
precedent.272
Fans of the Third Restatement argue that factored tests lead
to “murky” analysis and judicial manipulation.273 Such
arguments, however, forget that courts cannot abandon their
precedent on negligence in the application of the test.274 Courts
must weigh the factors according to their common law on duty.275
for a no-duty determination and instead articulating the policy or principle at
stake will contribute to transparency, clarity, and better understanding of tort
law.”).
270. See supra notes 173–77 and accompanying text (discussing the opinion
that Section 7 brings more clarity and transparency to duty analysis because it
requires courts to explicitly state their policy reasons for not finding a duty
rather than hiding behind other negligence doctrines).
271. See supra note 246 (listing the many cases in which courts performed
duty analysis using a formulation of these factors, rather than relying on public
policy alone).
272. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 7
(2010) (requiring every court to automatically find a duty unless public policy
considerations suggest a no-duty determination), with Rochon v. Saberhagen
Holdings, Inc., 140 Wash. App. 1008, at *2 (2007) (finding a duty by using
“[s]tate supreme court precedent,” which requires an analysis of foreseeability in
defining duty).
273. Kotlarsky, supra note 137, at 486.
274. See Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989)
(describing stare decisis as “a basic self-governing principle within the Judicial
Branch, which is entrusted with the sensitive and difficult task of fashioning
and preserving a jurisprudential system that is not based upon ‘an arbitrary
discretion’” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (H.
Lodge ed., 1888))).
275. See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams, 608 S.E.2d 208, 209 (Ga. 2005)
(deciding the case under Georgia’s common law on duty); Satterfield v. Breeding
Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 362 (Tenn. 2008) (considering how Tennessee
tort law “has developed over the years” in its determination of duty in takehome asbestos exposure cases); Alcoa, Inc. v. Behringer, 235 S.W.3d 456, 460
(Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (applying the test that the Texas Supreme Court uses in
determining the existence of a legal duty); Rochon, 140 Wash. App. at *2
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Thus, using this proposed framework, each state court’s analysis
will be homogenous. Allowing for flexibility within the structure
of a four-prong test ensures that a state can conform to its
negligence jurisprudence while bringing an element of uniformity
to duty analysis nationwide.
B. Calling for a Legislative Response
Part IV.A of this Note proposes a method by which the
judiciary can address the legal problem of duty in take-home
asbestos exposure cases.276 While the multi-factor test can help
courts handle lawsuits arising under this theory for now, the only
way a state can ensure complete consistency in this area is
through legislative action. Because these cases implicate
competing public policies,277 elected government representatives,
rather than judicial bodies, should decide which policy prevails.278
Prior to the emergence of take-home asbestos exposure cases,
the Supreme Court urged Congress to act in response to the
“elephantine mass of asbestos cases” brought about by workers’
occupational exposure to asbestos, stating that asbestos litigation
“defies customary judicial administration and calls for national
legislation.”279 Congress has tried on several occasions to pass the
requested legislation.280 The Asbestos Health Hazards
(stating that the existence of a legal duty depends on “[s]tate supreme court
precedent”).
276. See supra Part IV.A (proposing a four-prong test to determine duty in
secondhand asbestos exposure cases).
277. See supra notes 228–34 and accompanying text (considering the
competing social policies involved in take-home asbestos cases).
278. See supra notes 235–36 and accompanying text (suggesting that
legislators, rather than courts, should determine matters of public policy).
279. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999); see also GRIFFIN B.
BELL, NAT’L LEGAL CTR. FOR THE PUB. INTEREST, ASBESTOS LITIGATION AND
JUDICIAL LEADERSHIP: THE COURTS’ DUTY TO HELP SOLVE THE ASBESTOS
LITIGATION CRISIS 3 (2002) (describing the Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos
Litigation, appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist in 1991, that reported on the
state of the asbestos crisis). The Committee stated that the asbestos problem “is
becoming a disaster of major proportions . . . which the courts are ill-equipped to
meet effectively.” Id. Additionally, the Committee warned that “the worst is yet
to come” and pleaded for Congress to “formulate a national solution.” Id.
280. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 4, at 130 (“Since the inception of
asbestos litigation in the 1970s, more than 15 bills have been introduced in the
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Compensation Act of 1981,281 an unsuccessful Senate bill, would
have established an exclusive remedy to employees injured by
occupational exposure to asbestos in the form of workers’
compensation.282 The Occupational Disease Compensation Act of
1983,283 also unsuccessful, would have established a compulsory
compensation program for employees for “death or disability
resulting from work-related exposure to toxic substances,”
including asbestos.284 A type of compensation structure that
would use arbitration, negotiation, and mini trials to address
compensation for injuries caused by asbestos exposure was also in
the works in the 1980s, but it never became operational.285
Just as Congress has been unable to launch proposed
solutions to occupational asbestos exposure, likewise, federal
legislative responses to non-occupational exposure have failed to
mature. In 1995, responding to “continued reports of
contamination in workers’ homes for a number of dust
particles,”286 Congress considered the Workers’ Family Protection
Act.287 The Act directed the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH) to conduct a study on worker home
contamination, including that caused by asbestos.288 NIOSH
reported an increased risk for certain lung diseases, such as
mesothelioma, lung cancer, and asbestosis, among the families of

U.S. Congress proposing to change the nation’s approach to resolving asbestos
claims.”).
281. Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Act of 1981, S.1643, 97th
Cong. (1981).
282. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 232, at 29 (describing the Asbestos
Health Hazards Compensation Act).
283. Occupational Disease Compensation Act of 1983, H.R. 3175, 98th Cong.
(1983).
284. Bill Summary and Status H.R. 3175, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.
gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d098:1:./temp/~bdgyFE:@@@L&summ2=m&|/home/Legis
lativeData.php?n=BSS;c=98| (last visited Jan. 28, 2014) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
285. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 232, at 31 (describing the Asbestos
Claims Facility, a concept developed by asbestos producers and insurers that
would resolve asbestos-related claims filed by workers).
286. Donovan, supra note 60, at 705.
287. Workers’ Family Protection Act, S. 353, 102d Cong. (1991).
288. See Donovan, supra note 60, at 705 (presenting two bills that Congress
considered in the early 1990s to study the issue of home contamination).
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asbestos-exposed workers.289 No further congressional action
was taken based on these results.290
Additionally, in 2005, Congress considered but did not pass
the Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act.291 This
legislation sought to “relieve the Federal and State courts of the
burden of the asbestos litigation” by creating a fund to “provide
the necessary resources for a fair and efficient system to resolve
asbestos injury claims” such that victims could be compensated
for their injuries.292 “Any exposed person” could access the
fund.293 Thus, those injured by take-home asbestos exposure
could make a claim under this Act rather than resorting to the
court system.294 The proposal died in the Senate.295
Seeing the failure of federal initiatives, a number of states
have statutorily responded to the issue of liability for injuries
caused by take-home exposure to asbestos. Kansas and Ohio
have eliminated by statute any cause of action that a victim of
secondhand asbestos exposure might have against a premises
owner.296
In
Boley
v.
Goodyear
Tire
&
Rubber
289. See id. (stating the results of the study).
290. See id. (stating that the purpose of the Act was simply to “review past
home contamination incidents as reported in the published or in governmental
records” and to evaluate the “regulatory, statutory, and industrial hygiene
measures being used by employers to prevent or remediate home
contamination”).
291. Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2005, S. 852, 109th Cong.
(2005).
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See id. (defining the Act’s application to take-home exposure). The
provision states the following:
A claimant may alternatively satisfy the medical criteria
requirements of this section where a claim is filed by a person who
alleges their exposure to asbestos was the result of living with a
person who, if the claim had been filed by that person, would have
met the exposure criteria for the given disease level, and the claimant
lived with such person for the time period necessary to satisfy the
exposure requirement, for the claimed disease level.
Id.
295. See S. 852 (109th): FAIR Act of 2005, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.gov
track.us/congress/bills/109/s852 (last visited Jan. 28, 2013) (summarizing the
life of the Act) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
296. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4905 (2006) (“No premises owner shall be
liable for any injury to any individual resulting from silica or asbestos exposure
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Co.,297 the Supreme Court of Ohio interpreted and applied Ohio’s
statute to a case in which the plaintiff contracted mesothelioma
allegedly from inhaling asbestos dust from her husband’s work
clothes.298
To determine whether the Ohio statute applied, the court
looked to the intent of the Ohio General Assembly.299 The
legislation targeted the enhancement of the judicial system’s
ability to “supervise and control litigation and asbestos-related
bankruptcy proceedings,” as well as the conservation of the
“scarce resources of the defendants.”300 Accordingly, the court
held that the statute bars a premises owner’s liability in tort
“unless the exposure occurred at the owner’s property.”301 The
court held in favor of the defendant premises owner, ruling that
the statute “unambiguously prohibits take-home-asbestos
claimants” from recovering from premises owners.302
The Ohio statute, along with the subsequent judicial
decision, provides an example of a state’s frustration with the
“explosion in asbestos litigation.”303 While only Ohio and Kansas
have passed statutes that entirely prohibit claims against
premises owners by those who never entered the premises, other
state legislatures have also acted to slow the growth of asbestos
litigation.304 Several states have adopted “objective minimum
medical criteria standards for plaintiffs filing asbestos exposure
unless such individual's alleged exposure occurred while the individual was at
or near the premises owner's property.” (emphasis added)); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2307.941 (West 2004) (“A premises owner is not liable for any injury to any
individual resulting from asbestos exposure unless that individual’s alleged
exposure occurred while the individual was at the premises owner’s property.”
(emphasis added)).
297. 929 N.E.2d 448 (Ohio 2010).
298. See id. at 450 (considering whether the Ohio law prohibited liability of
the defendant premises owner when the exposure to asbestos did not occur at
his property).
299. See id. at 451 (stating that statutory construction requires considering
the legislative intent of the statute).
300. Id. at 453 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
301. Id. (majority opinion).
302. Id. (O’Connor J., concurring).
303. Michael D. Kelley, Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 37 OHIO N.U.
L. REV. 901, 912 (2011).
304. See id. at 913−14 (describing asbestos litigation reform in the states).
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claims.”305 In addition, states have reformed their rules of civil
procedure in an attempt to limit claims for damages caused by
asbestos injuries.306
Given states’ varying public interests307 and the uneven
distribution of asbestos claims throughout the nation,308 the most
appropriate response to take-home asbestos exposure differs for
each state. Therefore, individual state statutory responses most
effectively address the problem of take-home asbestos exposure.
All states have an interest in furthering the purposes of the tort
system by compensating those who are injured by the acts of
others.309 State legislatures should be mindful of this purpose
when considering the issue of take-home asbestos.310 Some states,
however, bear a large concentration of the nation’s asbestos
litigation.311 These states, therefore, have an interest in reducing
305. See id. at 914 (stating that the state legislatures in Florida, Georgia,
Kansas, South Carolina, and Texas have enacted minimum medical criteria
requirements that have significantly reduced the number of asbestos-related
case filings). Such laws require “non-malignant plaintiffs” to demonstrate injury
via a diagnosis by a proper medical authority prior to filing an active claim. Id.;
see also FLA. STAT. § 774.201 (2007), repealed as unconstitutional by Am. Optical
Corp. v. Spiewak, 73 So. 3d 120, 133 (Fla. 2011) (holding that retroactive
application of § 774.204 violated the plaintiffs’ due process rights under the
Florida Constitution and that the rest of § 774 was unconstitutional as not
severable); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-4 (2012) (requiring “prima-facie” evidence of
physical impairment for asbestos claims); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4902 (2012)
(requiring physical impairment as an “essential element” in an asbestos claim);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-135-50 (2012) (requiring medical reports for plaintiffs
claiming an asbestos-related injury); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 90.003
(West 2009) (same).
306. See Kelley, supra note 303, at 915 (discussing successful procedural
reforms states have initiated, such as proscribing asbestos claim consolidations
and strictly enforcing venue rules).
307. See supra Part III.C.2 (demonstrating the differing public interests
associated with take-home asbestos cases).
308. See infra note 311 and accompanying text (illustrating the distribution
of asbestos litigation at the state level).
309. See DOBBS, supra note 23, at 17 (“Compensation of injured persons is
one of the generally accepted aims of tort law . . . . If a person has been wronged
by a defendant, it is just that the defendant make compensation.”).
310. See, e.g., Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 929 N.E.2d 448, 453
(Ohio 2010) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that one purpose behind the
General Assembly’s enactment of legislation for exposure to asbestos off of the
landowner’s premises was to “fully preserve the rights of claimants who were
exposed to asbestos”).
311. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 4, at 62 tbl.3.3 (illustrating that Ohio,
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asbestos lawsuits and purging the “specter of limitless liability”312
associated with take-home asbestos. As such, they might want to
consider adopting a statutory response similar to Ohio’s by
barring the liability of premises owners for asbestos injuries
contracted by those who never entered the premises.313
Alternatively, in states where asbestos litigation does not
greatly burden the courts, the legislators can draft statutes that
recognize the rarity of secondhand exposure cases. The
legislature should review literature on the history of asbestos and
determine the date on which the asbestos industry should have
been aware of the risks of take-home asbestos exposure.314 Then,
the statute should allow compensation for exposures occurring
after this date and bar compensation if the plaintiff’s exposure
took place prior to the date. As discussed supra, many courts
conduct this type of analysis when hearing take-home asbestos
exposure cases.315
V. Conclusion
Though some feel that the asbestos crisis is reaching its
end,316 it seems that the litigation will continue for the next few
decades.317 Asbestos affects people beyond the employer and
employee, resulting in lawsuits originating in the household.
Texas, New York, Mississippi, and West Virginia received sixty-six percent of
the country’s filings of asbestos claims).
312. In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115, 122 (N.Y. 2005).
313. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.941 (West 2004) (limiting the liability
of premises owners for injuries allegedly caused by asbestos on their property).
314. The legislature should review sources such as those discussed supra
note 60.
315. See supra notes 40–56 and accompanying text (illustrating the cases in
which the court compared the date on which the plaintiff’s asbestos-injury
occurred with the industry’s understanding of asbestos at that time).
316. See Mark A. Behrens & Phil Goldberg, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis:
The Tide Appears to Be Turning, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 477, 503 (2006) (arguing
that reforms in the area of asbestos litigation have lowered the number of
asbestos claims filed).
317. See Cooper, supra note 2 (stating the opinion that asbestos litigation
will “continue for the next few decades”); Schwartz, supra note 12, at 4
(recognizing that trial judges have made “major accomplishments” in the
asbestos litigation but emphasizing that problems in this area still exist).
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Courts must reflect on their state’s policies and law on the
existence of duty to determine how to react to secondhand
exposure cases, perhaps considering the factored test described in
Part IV.A. But more importantly, legislatures must get involved
in this conflict. Rather than allowing asbestos litigation to
continue to occupy a large share of court dockets for years to
come,318 state legislatures should evaluate the history of asbestos
litigation to reach a statutory solution that will further the public
policies of their respective states. By tackling this segment of
asbestos litigation, the nation gets one step closer to ending this
legal nightmare.

318. See Cooper, supra note 2 (analyzing the progress of asbestos litigation
as it enters its sixth decade).

